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Cleary, Mark C . , M.A., Summer, 19 75 History
The German Intellectual's Adjustment to National 
Socialism (102 pp.)
Director: Oscar J. Hammen
This study is an investigation into the German intel­
lectual's collaboration with the National Socialist 
German state. Qualitative rather than quantitative, 
it is a speculative interpretation of the forces that 
influenced willing support of the Nazis by the German 
intelligentsia. As a societal study, the thesis puts 
the intellectual into the larger drama of the national 
enthusiasm for Hitler in 1933, and it examines the p o s ­
sible motives, pure and cynical, for the spiritual 
coordination fGleichschaltung) of the German academi­
cian. The premise of the work is that the majority of 
German intellectuals had a free and individual choice. 
Tills choice, despite its Faustian implication, was of­
ten no more dramatic than a scholar’s decision to stay 
in Germany and continue his career under Nazi auspices.
Atomization, coupled with narrow professionalism, 
made the German intellectual easy to control and will­
ing to work for the Nazis. That this was not true in 
all cases does not negate the fact that it was true in 
the majority of cases. Presentation of personal ac­
counts of the Gleichschaltung give the reader a f e e l ­
ing for the mood in Germany between 1933 and 1945.
The main conclusion, though highly speculative, is 
that: (1) German intellectual adjustment to Nazi rule
was apolitical, and (2) political amorality among in­
tellectuals in a modern industrial nation is encouraged 
by social and professional compartmentalization within 
a technocratic environment.
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION
"The German Intellectual's Adjustment to National Social­
ism" is an interpretation of the social and institutional 
foundations that made such an adjustment not only possible, 
but natural. "Adjustment" is the most appropriate word when 
the change is described from a conservative German viewpoint. 
The Weimar era required tremendous mental readjustment of 
traditional conservative standards in politics and society.
In sharp contrast, National Socialism seemingly offered a re­
turn to many of the old values by curtly rejecting Western 
democracy and the conglomeration of liberal and socialist 
ideals that threatened the conservatives' peace of mind. The 
change to Nazism was buffered by a remembraTice of better times 
and the hope that Weimar and defeat could be forgotten in the 
bustle of activity surrounding the New Order.
The renewed emphasis on absolute authority expressed in 
the N.S.D.A.P. (National Socialist German Workers Party) 
leadership signaled a corresponding demand for obedience 
within a national hierarchy. It struck a firm chord of res­
onance with the class-consciousness of the German people.
The educated middle class saw their hopes reborn as every-
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
where strength and quality were being called for to build 
the New Germany. Their sons naively envisioned a place for 
the working intellectual alongside the Nazi leadership at 
the head of the New Order. Did not progress in a modern 
world demand the intellectual's talents?
But, while the decision to help build the New Germany 
by becoming a party member or by offering specially acquired 
talents may have been a popular, even frivolous gesture for 
many Germans, continued participation became an individual 
choice for the German intellectual. Unlike the common sol­
dier or Nazi party member of low rank and poor background, 
the German intellectual did not feel genuinely trapped in a 
particular position. He was quite capable of providing his 
own alternatives by writing out the necessary resignation or 
application for transfer if, in his judgment, his work had 
soured for him. This was true at least during the years be­
fore the war. The intellectual had been recruited for his 
personal abilities and skills in a specialized field.
There was a tendency in some men that tied them to their 
agreements, once the bargain was struck. This was especially 
true if the agreement required little or no physical and/or 
psychological discomfort. For the technician living in Nazi 
Germany, the intense concentration of a highly specialized 
career closed off all matters not pertaining to that career. 
In addition, a mania for self-imposed isolation improved a
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
specialist’s powers of concentration, removing him from even 
the most repulsive distractions to his work. Many psychologi­
cal "discomforts" were thus avoided at the outset. News of 
war atrocities, for example, could be systematically ignored 
by an armaments researcher as a distraction from his work. As 
an indirect participant, he scarcely felt the need to ratio­
nalize atrocities, even if he created the devices that made 
such crimes possible. In a situation of direct involvement 
in atrocities, the specialist attempted to isolate himself in 
the same way, with varied success. In some cases, career ded­
ication hardened the psyche’s defenses to overcome all dis­
tractions. This applied to a small, but very significant per­
centage of German intellectuals.
It is impoitant at this point to define specifically what 
is meant by "intellectual" in the context and scope of this 
work. The German intellectual in question was university- 
educated, invariably. His social and economic circumstances 
led him to seek employment in a university, civil service or 
commercial environment where his university specialty would 
be respected and given primary emphasis. The intellectual 
used his degree as a springboard to the goals of material 
security, social rank and personal distinction in his chosen 
career field. His attitude was expansive. "To do great, im­
portant work" was considerably more important to this intel­
lectual than "to become rich," though a moderate standard of
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
living was assumed, because of background, without saying. 
Professional rank, too, had an overwhelming attraction for 
such a man.
The intellectual in this work appears as a product of 
a mellowed German middle class, but he is tired of old so­
lutions to new problems. He may accept or reject his back­
ground consciously, but his class background must be assumed 
tacitly. For the purposes of this interpretation the German 
intellectual is characterized by his attitude toward, and 
compliance with, orders. His willingness to follow precise 
orders might be mitigated by his university training to dis­
cuss motives, investigate meanings and offer alternatives to 
difficult problems. In short, there may be for the intellec­
tual a willingness to question orders that might otherwise be 
blindly obeyed. The numbed, "I was only following orders'* 
excuse might not apply to those German intellectuals in the 
active service of Hitler and the Reich.
There is, in the author's opinion, a qualitative differ­
ence between the actions of the German intellectual and the 
actions of the common soldier. Alongside the intellectual's 
influence in the administration of the Third Reich, must be 
measured his deeds and his culpability. But, at the same 
time, this paper is not a condemnation of the German intel­
ligentsia. This work portrays the German intellectual as 
an isolated individual, like many other Germans, trying to
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
adjust himself to the phenomenon of National Socialism.
Obviously, the intellectual’s talents allowed him 
greater opportunities for cooperation with the Nazis than 
did the skills of more common Germans. Likewise, the indict­
ment of intellectuals in the SS (Schutzstaffel or ’’protection 
unit") and Gestapo reflected on the German intelligentsia as 
a whole. Even the crimes reviewed by the International Tri­
bunal at Nuremberg were intellectual in nature: the plans
for gas chambers, mass crematoria and "death train" timetables 
required the skills of chemists, engineers, doctors and ad­
ministrators. The cold-blooded planning of the Nazi death 
camps may be judged as the greatest horror of the Second 
World War.
But as the tribunal at Nuremberg sought to identify war 
criminals and avoid a blanket condemnation of the German peo­
ple, so "The German Intellectual’s Adjustment to National So- 
sialisra" seeks to separate personalities from causes and give 
a balanced picture of the German intellectual in the Nazi era. 
Moreover, the individual impressions of the Gleichschaltung 
(coordination) and the conclusions in the summary chapter 
point to minor and major themes that are significant. Re­
spectively, these minor and m.ajor themes are: (1) German
intellectual adjustment to Nazi rule was apolitical, and 
(2) political morality among intellectuals in a modern.
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industrial nation is encouraged by social and professional 
compartmentalization within the technocratic environment.
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CHAPTER II
ACADEMIC FOUNDATIONS, WEIMAR, AND THE NAZIS
To understand the German intellectual of the Hitler era, 
one must have a general idea of the social and educational 
forces that shaped his thinking. A study of education soci­
ety in the Imperial and Weimar periods is of value, especially 
if one has a knowledge of the conservatism and narrow profes­
sionalism found in German universities before the turn of the 
century.
At this point, it is necessary to clarify what is meant 
by narrow professionalism. First, there was an unwritten 
agreement between the civil authority and the university that 
the academic institution would function independently, without 
regard to politics or the society as a whole. The university 
had its place in society and would serve the society as a 
source of bureaucrats (especially under Bismarck), but aside 
from this function, it agreed to exist apolitically. In this 
manner, Willielminian Germany was administered by civil ser­
vants, and the university stayed out of politics.
Within the university, narrow professionalism signified 
the individual scholar's mandate to devote himself entirely 
to a special discipline or interest. Even if the university 
were to lose its independence under Hitler, the individuals
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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within the various departments of the university still main­
tained, to a degree, their personal independence. Conversely, 
the individuals within the university were the university, and 
the Nazi Gleichschaltung may not have been carried out in 
practice as much as in appearance. Many reactions were pos­
sible, and the universities' reaction to Nazi legislation is 
clouded with shadows of difference.
Generally though, the German universities before 1933 
retained much of their traditional independence thanks to the 
official policy of non-interference. They continued to choose 
their own professors and to maintain their faculties in a 
strict hierarchy of titled rank.^ But while the structural 
traditions of the German university were sustained and even 
strengthened, spiritual unity within the university community 
had gone by the way. The humanist traditions of the eight­
eenth century had been replaced gradually in the nineteenth 
century by a trend toward self-interested scholarship. The 
freedom to specialize became the newest cry for academic 
freedom in Germany. It was answered throughout the land with 
new specialized schools, departments, faculties and disci-
University faculties intensified this concern for rank 
by acknowledging a whole list of stratified titles and 
classifications for themselves and their protégés. A 
thorough description of the most common university titles 
is described by Robert H. Lowie in his Toward Understanding 
Germany (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954), pp. 
77-79.
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plines. Traditional university standards of political non­
involvement were strengthened by the student’s acceptance 
of a highly-specialized curriculum. In effect, the univer­
sity community offered a spectrum of independent disciplines
which the rector readily accepted as no more than the will 
2of the times.
3With the exceptions of the University of Heidelberg 
and the newer institutions in Hamburg and Cologne, a liberal 
education was waived by students for more intensive studies. 
A natural casualty of the specialized schools was the German 
radical, whose influence inside the university waned before 
the popularity of the romantics and the social historians.^
2Gabriel A. Almond noted in The Struggle for Democracy 
in Germany (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
1949), pp. 18, 19:
"The institutions of higher education trained loyal 
potential leaders in government and business.... Pa­
triotism and nationalism were standard intellectual 
fare to which imperialism was added and both elemen­
tary school teachers and university professors had 
as a rule to be politically and socially conserva­
tive....With rare exceptions like Max Weber, the num­
ber of original thinkers willing to criticize the 
existing order declined markedly, while the physical 
sciences developed brilliantly."
^Heidelberg was noted for its longstanding, liberal 
traditions, and the university successfully weathered the 
mania for specialization which was, at that time, so common 
among more conservative institutions.
4Author’s note: This does not mean that students and 
even junior faculty members were apathetic to social ills and 
the demands for their remedy. Rather, German universities 
shunned revolutionaries who aspired to professorial rank. A 
German faculty was unwilling to modify its conservative non-
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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A naive acceptance of organic national unity was the extent 
of political education for the greater part of the university. 
The academician did little more than succumb to social pres­
sure when he chose freedom in controlled doses as "a right to 
be exercised only in the service of the community.
In a world of growing specialization, the German univer­
sity was isolated from the outside world by the serious schol­
ar's desire to mind his own business. Specialized research in 
the pure sciences required the discipline of a monastic, but 
many Germans considered it a small price to pay for the rec­
ognition it brought them. The German university, likewise, 
gained recognition as a foundation of scholastic brilliance. 
Thus, the specialist and the German university thrived sym- 
biotically, each gaining strength from the other.
involvement in politics. Survival of the German university 
(in times of political trial) was predicated on the loyalty 
of its faculties to the existing order. Specialization, 
particularly in the sciences, diverted student attention 
away from the political sphere and was encouraged for that 
reason by the faculty. When the genuine radical lost his 
audience to the romantics and social historians, the German 
faculties were much relieved.
^Gerhard Ritter, The German Resistance (New York: Praeger, 
1958), p. 59, Ritter further commented:
"Thus national consciousness in Germany was not 
bound, as was the case in the West, to democratic 
ideas; it rested on the strong traditions of the 
German middle-class education even if liberals as 
liberals were to some extent opposed to them. Even 
after 1918 the admirers and advocates of Western 
democratic constitutions and ways of life were only 
a minority."
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Another side of specialization was the university's 
fraternity organization. The German student corps offered 
an exclusive comradeship difficult to resist. With their 
dueling codes and drinking traditions, fraternities had 
special attractions for all but the most serious of students. 
The social life of any German university owed much to its 
student corps, if only for the sheer manpower the system 
could raise for celebrations and official functions. The 
administration too had a measured respect for the frater­
nities' will, especially the most conservative of these 
corps.
Toward the end of the nineteenth century, the political 
activity of these corps took an ominous turn. In the 1890’s, 
a movement to bar Jews from German fraternities was started 
by members of the existing corps. By 1894, Jews had been 
effectively excluded from the German fraternity and refused 
even constituent status in any official university organiza­
tion.^ Jewish fraternities offered a positive alternative, 
and the Jewish Corps at Breslau had been in existence since 
1886. Jewish fraternities proliferated in the years that
^George L. Mosse, The Crisis of German Ideology (New
York: Grosset § Dunlap, 1964), p. 1 9 6 . Mosse's work indi­
cates that in southern Germany the prohibitions applied to 
baptized Jews as well. In the North, Jews who had converted 
to the Christian religion were considered acceptable, but 
the Eisenach Resolution of 1919 rescinded this technicality 
due to "the inherited racial divisions" that prevented Jews 
from becoming fraternity brothers.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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followed, but they were officially ostracized from univer­
sity affairs. Faculties and administrators sided with the 
non-Jewish Corps in cases of racial violence, which was
7not unusual at the turn of the century.
Friction between Jews and anti-Semites continued ran­
domly but perceptibly through the First World War and into
Othe Weimar era. In 1920, Jews again were barred from the 
dueling privilege in many German universities. The situa­
tion was aggravated further in 192 2, when student riots at 
the University of Berlin broke out over a memorial service 
for Walter Rathenau, the German-Jewish statesman.
During the First World War, a cultural pessimism set­
tled over the German university. When the First World War 
ended, psychological effects of collapse wore on. The intel­
ligentsia drew in upon itself. The effects of the war and 
its loss left strong feelings of resentment not always mani­
fested as outrage at the Etappe, "the stab in the back."
7In 1901, the faculty at the University of Heidelberg 
dissolved the local Jewish fraternity on the grounds that 
its existence "endangered peace among the students." (Ibid., 
p. 197.)
gBetween 1904 and 1918 Jews found increasing opportun­
ities for dueling partners. This was made possible by offi­
cial recognition of Jewish fraternities on many German cam­
puses. However, in 1910 the Kyffhauser Bund published a 
statement on anti-Semitism in their universities indicating 
that such prejudice was "common to all academic circles" 
and seemed to stem from volkish sentiments "intellectualized 
and transferred to elitist frameworks [i.e., fraternities] 
for implementation." (Ibid., p. 198.)
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13
Skepticism and pessimism combined to make many Germans 
reject previously existing social values. The writings 
of Ernst Junger, a former soldier whose four years on the 
Western Front had hardened him to an incredible degree, 
offered a well-developed nihilistic philosophy that ap­
pealed to a great many Germans and not an inconsiderable 
number of intellectuals of the Front Generation.^ The 
conservative intellectual's distrust of the new republic 
only intensified the political isolation of Germany's great 
universities.
^Koppel S. Pinson stated in his work, Modern Germany 
(New York: The MacMillan Company, 1954):
"No one in postwar Germany gave vent with such 
vehemence to the resentment against bourgeois cul­
ture and civilization at home and against foreign 
influence and domination abroad as did Junger in 
his writings between 1920 and 1933....he preached 
a gospel of heroic struggle and pan-destructionism." 
Pinson emphasized that Junger's work rested on his concept of 
the "soldier-worker" elite, a sort of Prussian Bolshevik type, 
who would tear down the sham of postwar German culture and re­
place it with a blood and iron socialism--not necessarily of 
the Nazi genre. Despite the elements of militant bolshevism 
inherent in Junger's philosophy, Pinson hastened to add:
"...the actual effect of his writings, like those 
of Spengler Fe.g .. Decline of the West] and Moeller 
van den Bruck, a rightist literary critic, was to 
attract to National Socialism elements of the popu­
lation that could not have been won over by other 
means--a cultural and educated youth who strictly 
speaking did not follow the Hitler program but who 
combined in an indefinite, nebulous, and purely 
emotional fashion pan-German and militaristic n a ­
tionalism with a revolutionary temper bent on de­
cisive action at all costs."
See Pinson, Modern Germany, pp. 464-465.
^^Expanding on this condition, Kuno Francke stated in his 
German Afterwar Problems (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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To this situation was added the pressure of inflated
student registration. The student boom in the Weimar era
was caused chiefly by a combination of greater educational
opportunity and much greater unemployment. As legions of
new students descended on the universities, competition for
11honors increased among teachers as well as students. Thus, 
disillusionment and overcrowding laid the cornerstone for the 
bitterness and frustration that plagued German universities.
In addition to the strict obedience to academic rank that sur­
vived, German scholars developed a decided talent for ruthless 
criticism of their peers and competitors. In conflicts be­
tween inferiors and superiors, it is the observation of Hans 
Maier that the rivalry between the Dozent (assistant profes­
sor) and the Qrdinarius (ordinary professor) was both intense 
and long-term. In his essay, "Nationalsozialistische 
Hochschulpolitik,’* Maier noted that the Dozent was kept in
1927), p. 5:
"And yet, what a service could these intellec­
tuals [i.e., of the old regime] have rendered to 
the young struggling German Republic... if they, 
particularly the teachers in the Gymnasia and 
the university professors had whole-heartedly 
accepted the new political responsibilities 
which the collapse of the old order brought for 
them.... Instead of that, a defiant pessimism 
seems to have settled upon the minds of these
men. "
I. L. Kandel, The Making of Nazis (New York: Teachers 
College, Columbia University, 1934), p. 456. In 1900, only 
one out of every 250 Germans had graduated from a university 
By 1933, this figure had risen to one out of twenty-two.
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his place by the "oligarchy of the ordinary professors" in 
the Weimar period. Only in the Nazi era was strict observa­
tion of rank discarded for a political, fluid form. The 
formation of the Dozentenschaft (Assistant Professors League), 
said Maier, answered the grievances of the Dozent and improved
the "legitimate and material positions for the extraordinary
12professors over the ordinary professors."
By the mid-1920's anti-Semites had gained a foothold, and 
faculty members as well as students were aiding them against 
the Jews, Aryan educators were not above appealing to preju­
dice in their attacks on Jewish opponents. Into the arena of 
intensive research, anti-Semitism and competition stepped the 
Nazis. Adjusting their rhetoric to the receptivity of stu­
dents and professors, the Nazis capitalized on the political 
naivete of their listeners within the intelligentsia. Where 
consistency was not a factor, Nazi rhetoricians gave full play 
to telling the audience what it wanted to hear. This tech­
nique proved no less successful with the middle-class intel­
lectual than it had with the working classes or the indus­
trialists .
As National Socialism grew in political strength from 
the mid-1920*s onward, it recruited professors and students 
as propagandists. Student frustration was working in the
1 9Helmut Kuhn et al.. Die Deutsche Universitat im 
Dritten Reich (Munich: Piper% 1966), p . ^31 (Paperback.)
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Nazis' favor. In 1925, the newly-organ!zed Deutsche Studen-
tenschaft (German Student League) declared its desire to
1 ̂merge with its racially-exclusive Austrian counterpart.
The German Minister of Culture, C. H. Becker, refused this 
request and his counter proposals only added to the league's 
frustration. With considerable Nazi encouragement, severe 
student riots broke out in 1931, affecting universities in 
Berlin, Cologne, Griefswald, Halle, Hamburg, Breslau, Kiel, 
Koenigsberg and Munich. While these riots produced few, if 
any, changes in the German university, they set a dangerous 
precedent and convinced the Nazis that student riots were a 
useful tool in the rise to power. In the riots of 1931, 
administrators remained passive, ignoring attacks on Jews 
and leftist members of their faculties. By 1931, the Deutsche 
Studentenschaft had grown to 140,000 members and was, by far, 
the largest German inter-university organization. In 1931, 
it came under the Nazi party’s control. Hitler’s star was 
in the ascendant, and his place in Germany's future was antic­
ipated in the universities.^'^
13Despite its anti-Semitic tendencies, the Deutsche 
Studentenschaft was not, in 1925, a Nazi-controlled orga­
nization. As late as 1929, German fraternities actively 
competed with the Nazis for student recruits, though their 
conservative and anti-Semitic appeal paralleled the appeals 
of National Socialism. (See Mosse, The Crisis of German 
Ideology, p. 2 71.)
^'^David Schoenbaum, Hitler's Social Revolution (Garden 
City, New York: Doubleday, 1966), p. 71. Before the party 
membership rolls were closed to applicants in 1933, the Nazi 
party had grown from roughly 850,000 in 1931 to nearly 
2,500,000.
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CHAPTER III 
HITLER IN POWER: THE UNIVERSITIES CONFORM
In January 1933, Hitler became Chancellor of Germany,
He was in a position to raze the ’’liberal and Marxist" in­
fluences of Weimar by sweeping away every vestige of that 
regime. As he had promised for years. Hitler accomplished 
this task with incredible swiftness and ruthlessness. The 
German states were reorganized into Gaue or districts, each 
with a Gauleiter or governor appointed directly by Hitler 
and thus directly responsible to the Chancellor.
One of the first acts of the new state authority was a 
move to regulate the number of new students entering the uni­
versities.^ On April 25, 1933, the Reich Minister of the 
Interior (Frick) announced a nationwide ceiling of 15,000 
on the number of Gymnasium (high school) graduates to be 
allowed to enter German universities. This figure was less 
than one-half of the 40,000 students expected to graduate 
from preparatory schools that spring. While the quota limit
Kandel, Making of Nazis, p. 511. Gymnasium examina­
tion committees were formed to decide who, among the new 
graduates, would be allowed to enter the universities. A l ­
though the orders came from the Ministry of Education, the 
committees were made up of local Gymnasium teachers. The 
final decision to reject a student'weighed fully on them.
17
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was severe, it would effectively relieve the overcrowding and
social pressure the university had experienced for years.
Unemployed graduates had been a chronic complaint in Weimar
Germany, and Hitler decided to remedy the problem at its 
2source.
In the same announcement of April 25, Frick declared 
that all Jews would be expelled from German universities. 
Wolfgang Kunkel, a physics professor and senior lecturer 
who had considerable knowledge of the universities at 
Gottingen, Heidelberg and Berlin during the Nazizeit (Nazi 
times), indicated that reactions to the summary dismissals 
of Jewish professors and students were mixed:
There were instances of students stand­
ing up for their teachers: In Berlin a num­
ber of young assistant professors and in­
structors of the law faculty undertook a 
protest against the dismissal of their 
older colleagues--with the result that they 
themselves were discharged, putting an end 
to their academic careers.
On the other hand.
It is hard to say, but such conduct [de­
nunciation of one*s colleagues] was based 
on latent anti-Semitism dating, as I sug­
gest, from the Weimar era. It was brought 
out by fear of being implicated, a wish 
that one not put himself in the line of 
fire of the terror that had begun to rule
^Franz L. Neumann stated in Behemoth (Toronto and New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1941), p. 399 that official 
policy reduced the total university enrollments for all of 
Germany from 97,576 in 1932 to 51,527 in 1938. Neumann 
also feels that the social composition within the univer­
sities during this period remained a constant middle-class 
to upper middle-class standard.
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in the German universities in the summer of 
1933.3
The far-reaching effects of the April 25 decree were 
immediately felt. Hans Maier noted that in Berlin in April 
1933:
Nazi students made demands of the acting 
Rector (Kohlrausch) in ’’Twelve theses Against 
the Un-German Spirit in the University" which 
was a blue-print for National Socialist dis­
organization of the university--Jews were 
never to be admitted as academic instructors 
or be allowed to publish in the Hebrew lan­
guage (!). In Kiel the students demanded, 
under threat of violence, the dismissal of 28 
professors; works by assistant professors that 
were deemed "un-German" were seized by student 
groups at several universities. Individual 
institutes were stormed.^
The expulsion of the Jews was carried out with thorough­
ness and efficiency. More than sixteen hundred academicians, 
of whom eleven hundred were professors or lecturers, were 
expelled within the first year of Hitler's rule. According 
to Hans Maier, the Academic Aid Organization in London re­
ported 313 ordinary professors, 109 extraordinary professors, 
75 honorary professors, 322 instructors and 42 lecturers dis­
missed. From scientific institutes, 133 researchers, 232 
assistants and 174 recent graduates were dismissed in the
c1933 purges.‘ The technical institutes faired somewhat better
^See Kuhn et al., Die Deutsche Universitat im Dritten 
Reich, pp. 118-119.
^Ibid., p . 78.
^Ibid., p . 82.
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than university schools: their losses amounted to 10.7 per­
cent of their staffs while the university average was about 
IS percent, with medical schools losing the greatest numbers 
and law schools sustaining the highest percentage of losses-- 
21.2 percent of their staffs.^
Jews were not the only victims of the early mass dis­
missals but as "racial enemies of the state" their visibil­
ity proved higher than that of the Social Democrats or other 
"dangerous liberals" among their colleagues whose Aryanism 
temporarily saved for them their university posts. Never­
theless, these more secret enemies of Nazism would be under
nclose observation shortly. Subsequently, premature pension­
ing became the most common method for removing outspoken 
critics among German faculties. The first phase of National 
Socialist university policy, said Hans Maier, was effected 
by the Nazis through the Reichswissenschaftsministerium
&Karl Dietrich Bracher, The German Dictatorship (New 
York: Praeger Publishers, 19 70)7 p. 269i Among those intel­
lectuals who emigrated from Germany, the problems of read­
justment did not end with their successful immigration.
While the physicists and mathematicians had no trouble in 
adjusting to lecturing in a foreign country once they had 
mastered the language, the lawyers had particular difficulty 
readjusting their skills to a new law system.
7On July 24, 1933, a declaration required all members 
of the civil service to present a written statement of their 
loyalty to the Reich. Primary and secondary school teachers 
(university instructors were not members of the civil ser­
vice) composed 22 percent of the estimated 700,000 civil ser­
vants, and their records were reviewed to weed out any unde­
sirables. By January 1934, the Ministry of Education was 
satisfied that its work had prompted "diligent compliance 
with the government." (See Kandel, Making of Nazis, p. 500.)
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(Reich Ministry of Education). It was ushered in by four 
events, which can be seen as the four steps of the Nazi 
Gleichschaltung of the German university. A moritorium of 
classes taught by unpopular professors began the sequence 
of events, using demonstrations, book-burnings and riots 
("started mostly by Nazi students," said Maier) to create 
the impression of a genuine student revolt. With feigned 
indignation, the Nazi authorities directed the Ministry of 
Education to introduce step two--state control through 
regimentation of the entire German university system. At 
the same time, a thorough purge of "undesirable" assistant 
professors and students completed step three of the Nazi 
plan.
Following the regimentation and purge, the Nazis pre­
sumed to make the German university "the center of a new 
folkish self-leadership, engaged in building offices of 
learning." This fourth step, an undertaking to be led by 
all the newly appointed university lecturers and those 
older scholars "whose hearts had turned to the movement" 
was reasonably successful.^ The reaction from university 
personnel who survived the major purges was surprisingly 
like the response given by the German civil service: without 
significant protest, Gleichschaltung was accepted by some as 
a bearable imposition, and by others as an opportunity to
O
Kuhn et al., Die Deutsche Universit'dt, pp. 76-77.
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reap government patronage. But, it would be unfair to typify 
the reaction only in these terms. Optimism, skepticism, even 
disinterest were also factors in the individual’s response. 
According to Wolfgang Kunkel:
For many university teachers the seizure 
of power by Hitler was either welcomed or 
accepted as an unavoidable event to make 
the best of. Some--but not too many, al­
though among them were prominent scholars-- 
let themselves get caught up in the spiri­
tual intoxication sweeping through Germany 
in early 1933. They really believed that 
a better age was beginning, a rebirth of 
German character with an emphasis on Na­
tional Socialism,
Further,
Other professors... more or less unaware 
of the threat, the mindlessness of National 
Socialism, saw in it the signs of a revolu­
tion...they believed they were chosen to 
help build the New Order that would lay the 
foundation for the development of an au­
thoritarian state system.
Considering opportunism and idealism as two possible motiva­
tions, Kunkel declared:
I must mention here, and make perfectly 
clear...that the baseness of many of my 
erstwhile colleagues in uniting with Na­
tional Socialism was not simply a matter 
of opportunitism but was more often an 
example of genuine idealism that they 
gave away freely to an evil thing.9
^Ibid., pp. 120-121. Schoenbaum noted in Hitler* s 
Social Revolution, p. 263:
"... those sympathetic to the National Socialist 
cause advanced into positions vacated by Jews^and 
political opponents and occasional party proteges 
and charlatans like Hans Gunther, the racist, or 
Willy Borger, the Cologne Trustee of Labor were
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An Aryan stance could further many ambitions in Nazi 
Germany, not the least of which was university advancement 
or professional prestige. An unprincipled use of anti- 
Semitic criticism lent tremendous emphasis to a scholar's 
work, silenced his critics in Germany and discounted the 
work of his opponents. Again, Wolfgang Kunkel noted:
There was also pure opportunism, 
naturally. There were people who could 
forget their political past, and continue 
their careers or (unless they did not 
need to) rationalize the validity of mak­
ing a sacrificium intellectus. To such 
people it was never wrong.id
Kunkel acknowledged that "the Germany university was brown" 
(i.e., Nazi) but he stated that many within the university 
neither helped nor hindered the Nazis in this transforma­
tion. Concerning dogma, most lecturers and researchers made 
no concessions and the nonsense of "German Physics" (a sys­
tem that denounced Einstein's theory of relativity) "was not 
taken seriously, in the scientific sense, by a n y o n e . D u r ­
ing the purge of the universities, whole schools of thought 
went into exile and many of the remaining disciplines were 
perverted, but some areas went untouched.
given professorial rank. But that this was limited 
can be seen by comparing the professorial losses 
with the active staff of 1938. Rather than dis­
tributing professorships, the Third Reich tended to 
leave the holes unfilled or filled them from below.
^®Ibid., p. 121.
^^Ibid., pp. 125, 131.
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Every one of the dismissed professors re­
ported that the older generation of scholars 
was left undisturbed by the Nazis, provided, 
of course, that it was not active against 
them.
At the same time, however, the rate of professional 
advancement within the faculty system was accelerated. The 
Privatdozent, characteristically a long transitional period 
in a scholar's life, was reduced due to vacancies brought 
about by purge dismissals. There was a shortening of the 
newcomer's partial-status time, before he received full 
teaching rank. This was particularly true in the medical 
schools and law schools, where vacancies were very numerous.
In 19 33, the German conservative middle class generally 
believed that the rough edges of National Socialism could and 
would be ironed out. To accelerate this refining process, 
members of the intelligentsia involved themselves in "parlor 
Nazism" a sort of political dilettantism.^^ Since the major­
ity of the Nazis' critics had been expelled from public life, 
intimidated or deported by the end of 1934, the arguments for 
or against cooperation with the New Order was largely a matter
1 7Schoenbaum, Hitler's Social Revolution, p. 263.
^^Ibid., p. 263.
^^In The German Dictatorship, p. 248, Bracher believed 
that the Old Guard Nazis recognized and rebuffed the new­
comers as opportunists and parasites, but "...this does not 
alter the fact that intellectual fellow travelers at first 
rendered most valuable assistance. Goebbels, the 'intel­
lectual* among the Nazi leaders, was the one to see and 
exploit this most skillfully...."
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of individual conscience and Nazi propaganda influence.
K. F. Werner summed up the situation very well:
As we have seen, the alliance of army, 
industry, university and church with the 
regime must have suggested itself in the 
union of the German people, in their 
growing well-being with each succeeding 
year under Hitler. Without being the 
same thing, the people and the party had 
many things in common: one did not like 
the Jews, one loathed the communists 
or feared them, one appreciated the 
"order" that now reigned and noted the 
harsh punishment against profiteering... 
one applauded the disappearance of unem­
ployment, one was pleased with the "home­
coming" of the Saar, Austria, the Sudeten- 
land, Memelland, and Danzig. The appetite 
came with eating, not only for the Nazis.15
Ignoring opportunism as the compelling force, there were
several other consideratoins that might drive a professional
scholar or working intellectual into the arms of the Nazi
party.
One factor that required serious thinking was the Nazis' 
de facto control of cultural life within Germany's borders.
On September 23, 1933, the Chamber of Culture became an 
official organization of the Reich. It was included under 
the Ministry of Propaganda and it had been the special proj- 
ect of Dr. Goebbels. The chamber was composed of seven 
divisions: the chambers of art, cinema, writing, journalism, 
radio, theater, and music. An advisory council which in-
l^K. P. Werner, Das NS-Geschichtsbild und die deutsche 
Geschichtswissenschaft (Stuttgart, Berlin, Cologne, Mainz: 
W. Kohlhammer Verlag, 1967), pp. 107-108.
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eluded the presidents of these affiliated sub-chambers was 
created to advise the Propaganda Ministry of the chamber's 
progress and to meet periodically with Dr. Goebbels for his 
comments and orders.
The Reich Culture Chamber was defined as a control and 
censorship agency to which all intellectual workers had to 
belong. In effect, an artist's exclusion or expulsion from 
the chamber meant the end of his career in Germany. So much 
for the artists, musicians, writers and cinematographers and 
the university faculties of art, music, literature, and 
journalism. But what about the departments of medicine, law, 
history and philosophy?
Here the Ministry of Education had technical jurisdic­
tion under the provisions for all general education within 
the Reich. In reality, this jurisdiction was applied only 
randomly after 1934 as more specialized teachers' clubs and 
associations became responsible to the Nazi party. The 
Federal Institute for the History of the New Germany rewrote 
history to Nazi specifications. The National Socialist Law­
yers' Organization did their part by writing articles that
Richard Strauss accepted the presidency of the Reich 
Music Chamber and Hans Blunck accepted a similar post in the 
Literature Chamber. The support of these two famous person­
alities for Goebbels' Culture Chamber was only one facet of 
intellectual cooperation. Rudolph Binding, Max Halbe, and 
Hans Johnst supported Blunck's decision and assisted him in 
the Literature Chamber. (See Bracher, The German Dictator- 
ship, p. 267.)
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condemned the Jews. These were only two of the organizations
that took over the Education Ministry's surveillance of uni-
17versity personnel. As K. F. Werner noted:
The assistant professors were forced to 
join the National Socialist Assistant Pro­
fessors Union while the students were forced 
into the National Socialist Student Union.
The scholars forcibly cut off from foreign 
countries lost their contact with foreign 
research and degenerated into spiritual 
provincialism. Professors, who with de­
termination pointedly opposed or at least 
would consider announcing their opposition, 
had to put such appearances into the sur­
rounding context, so that they read as a 
hymn to the new state. These images were 
undeniably true, so much that if one has 
not lived under the totalitarian system, 
one can not visualize the hardship and 
helplessness of those who could not agree 
with the system and yet had to live and 
suffer under it.18
Although the articulated stance in favor of the Nazi 
government was a factor that influenced an academician's 
professional actions, his life was conditioned to jump when 
the department said so, and this fact did not change under 
the Nazis. Werner stated:
Where did the assistant professors who 
were suited to follow the party line come 
from? Their number stayed low, and the 
clamor over their shortcomings did not last 
long. The criteria for their suitability 
put them in the hands of the newly estab­
lished ordinary professors and each had to 
resign himself to the will of the faculty.
The faculties fought against the state with 
silent opposition, meeting the graduation
17Newmann, Behemoth, pp. 123-124,
1 fiWerner, Das-NS Geschichtsbild, p. 47.
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and promotion of such candidates with 
hostility or indifference- They continued 
to maintain the departmental point of view 
with few exceptions. No overt resistance 
was detected, but passive resistance was 
successful through their departmental at­
titude. 19
Another factor influencing a scholar’s acceptance of 
Nazi will was its non-interference in his work- While po­
litical activities were carefully regulated, specialized 
research, because of its inherent complexity, was allowed 
to continue unhampered. That this last most important re­
fuge of narrow professionalism was left inviolate may ex­
plain why Germany continued to enjoy the benefits of an 
advancing technology while social sciences and the arts 
stagnated in the confines of Nazi Kultur. In many cases, 
the researcher was astonished at the encouragement and honors 
that his work received. The more functional discoveries al­
ways excited party circles. From the time a researcher re­
ceived his first official accolades, it was a short interlude 
before the flattered intellectual accepted research grants or 
assignments to one of the Nazis’ special projects. Praise
was as much an inducement to open cooperation as terror,
20social pressure or the demands of earning a living. In the
1QWerner, Das NS-Geschichtsbild, p. 68.
20 In the 19th edition of Adolf Bartels’ literary history, 
the author wrote: "I cannot deny that I was proud when Adolf
Hitler on May 1st of this year bestowed on me the Eagle Plaque 
of the German Reich.” (See Lowie, Toward Understanding Ger­
mai^, p. 160.)
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end, it was this positive attraction of National Socialism 
that kept most of Germany's intelligentsia at home after 
1933. Nothing could match the first waves of enthusiasm 
that engulfed Germany in 1933, but the intellectual's dis­
illusionment was tempered by new self-respect and the faith 
that his work was valuable, even to the Nazis.
Of necessity, the Nazi state recognized the absolute 
demand for intellectuals in a modern technological state. 
Where progress was concerned, no modern nation could sub­
sist on the service of technicians alone. The pure scien­
tist, theorist or researcher was an irreplaceable part of the 
industrial state. The university and whatever harmless trap­
pings it possessed were, likewise, essential. If researchers 
and theorists were needed, the university would have to stay. 
Grudgingly, Hitler admitted this fact. In a speech in Berlin 
on December 12, 1940, Hitler told the workers at the 
RheinmetallBorsig Works :
I was obliged to take a stand that in the 
existing situation we could not afford to 
make experiments. It certainly would have 
been simple to eliminate the intelligentsia.
Such a process could be carried out at once.
But we would have to wait fifty or perhaps a 
hundred years for the gap to refill--and 
such a period would mean the destruction 
of the nation.
The younger generation of Nazis assimilated this basic 
truth faster than their elders. Parlor Nazism and the intel-
21Adolf Hitler, My New Order, ed. Raoul de Roussy de 
Sales (New York: Reynal  ̂ Hitchcock, 1941).
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lectual had been rejected by the Party Old Guard in 1933
and 1934, but student youth leaders were accepted by the
2 2Hitler Jugend (Hitler Youth) from the mid-1930's onward. 
Increasing numbers of students were sent abroad by the Nazi 
Student Exchange program and the SS was recruiting univer­
sity graduates to fill its special branches. This Nazi 
patronage was a realistic maneuver to recruit the intel­
lectual and use his skills to promote National Socialism's 
grand designs. The most pragmatic of Germany’s intellectuals 
realized and accepted this arrangement, profiting from the 
terms of their cooperation. But, this was not always the 
case, as K. F. Werner observed:
When one has attempted to describe this 
area Gleichschaltung through sketches, one 
has come closer to answering the question 
of the professors' reaction to Hitler's 
rule. Of the weak connection between the 
ordinary professors, the mass influence of 
the students, and the NSDAP before 1933 
one must call attention to the fact : Before 
the assumption of power, no ordinary pro­
fessor was a party member. It is a state­
ment that should be stressed, that the uni­
versities with their senates and faculties
22 Schoenbaum, Hitler's Social Revolution, p . 75;
"If through 1936 Hitler Youth leadership tended to 
be the monopoly of the "young workers" the appren­
tices and shop clerks of the pre-1933 days, from 
1936 on it tended to become an affair of the aca­
demically educated middle class. Klonne estimates 
that from 1936 on more than SO per cent of the 
Hitler Youth leadership was recruited from 'res­
pectable middle class' circles, and that the 
higher ranks included 25 per cent university stu­
dents and graduates."
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thought of the victorious party as "another 
world," confronting it like the church.
That notable Nazis like Goebbels, who had 
completed a university education, and some 
young scholars and assistant professors 
associated themselves with the party 
scarcely changed the fact that before 1933 
Alexander von Muller was no professor. 
Certainly the coordination was felt in the 
university and underpinned by the student 
organization. Hans Maier states the case 
of the researchers in the Reich Ministry 
of Education-- in 5 years 45 percent of all 
official chairs of learning were trans­
ferred to other parties.23
2 3Werner, Das NS-Geschichtsbild, pp. 43 and 45. Werner 
stressed that the academic hierarchywas severely shocked, 
but it was not neutralized.
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CHAPTER IV 
ACCEPTANCE OF NAZISM: CAUSES
The acceptance of Hitler and rule by the Nazis was not 
merely the capitulation of the German intellectual, but was 
an event shared by elements of all the social strata of Ger­
many, excluding the Jewish community. Likewise, the German 
intellectual’s adjustment was an isolated instance of a more 
general condition, but it had so many points in common with 
the national acceptance that it appears a congruent, though 
smaller, example of the larger phenomenon. For the moment, 
this larger spectacle deserves our attention.
When Fabian von Schlabrendorff wrote The Secret War
Against Hitler, a study of the German resistance and his
part in it, he began his work with a condemnation of the
view, popularized by Willian Shirer in The Rise and Fall
2of the Third Reich that, as Shirer put it, "Nazism and 
the Third Reich, in fact, were but a logical continuation
^Fabian von Schlabrendorff. The Secret War Against 
Hitler (New York: Pittman Publishing Corporation, 1965),
^William L. Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the Third 
Reich (New York: Simon % Schuster, Inc., 1960).
32
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7of German history." Von Schlabrendorff saw this as an 
"incredibly primitive" view, believable because it contained 
cliche elements of truth that "are more misleading and harm­
ful than actual falsehoods." Since Nazism had rooted firmly 
in German soil, some analysts feared that it might germinate 
successfully in other educated lands. To allay this fear, 
von Schlabrendorff believed, non-German observers attempted 
to "prove that Nazism and its rule were peculiarly and ex­
clusively G e r m a n . S h i r e r ' s  thesis that Luther and the 
Reformation, the Thirty Years' War, and Prussianism in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were the three major 
antecedents leading to Hitler's rise, with the Prussian 
military machine and a subservient state bureaucracy as an 
immediate foundation for the Reich--were countered by von 
Schlabrendorff's more realistic appraisal of the immediate 
events. These were; the economic collapse after World War I 
(and a chronic instability in the Weimar economy mirrored in 
the faces of six million jobless workers); the spiritual de­
moralization following the defeat; and the widespread feeling
'’ibid., p. 133. Von Schlabrendorff cites R. D. 0. But­
ler’s From Luther to Hitler and Erich Fromm's studies of the 
Reformation as examples of the Shirer genre. This form of 
hindsight, centered on the Nazi experience, and looking back­
ward from the atmosphere it generated, is ironically not 
unlike the Nazis' own image of themselves as the culture- 
bearers for a new civilization based on a past German bar­
barism. (See von Schlabrendorff. The Secret W ar, p. 16.)
^See von Schlabrendorff. The Secret War, pp. 14, 16.
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cof indignation and anger over the Versailles Diktat.
But neither the obedience of the vast majority nor the 
resistance of the minority of Germans can be explained in 
such simplistic terms. No matter how these "causes" are 
determined, or with what prejudice, an answer to the ques­
tion of the Germans* adjustment to Nazism requires a deeper 
investigation into the psychological reactions of an entire 
people. Along this line, von Schlabrendorff holds that 
civil obedience to the legitimate political power of National 
Socialism (after 1933) was not the only restricting factor in 
the German resistance movement. There was a "reality" fab­
ricated and harped on by the Nazis that became a limited 
psychological reality in Germany. This was the proposition 
that all power of any kind in Germany would be labeled "Na­
tional Socialist," that resistance to National Socialism in 
any significant way would be crushed, and that any other re­
sistance, if successful in any permanent w a y , would be insig­
nificant .
Von Schlabrendorff maintains that Hitler’s constant ham­
mering on the single theme of National Socialism as Germany's 
inextricable link to the future served as a point of reference
5Von Schlabrendorff viewed these events and conditions 
as essential or "...Hitler would never have succeeded in 
making himself the master of the German People...." (Ibid., 
p. 21.) Further, public skepticism of Weimar's parliamen- 
tarianism aided Hitler in his abolition of its forms, includ­
ing all previous restrictions on the power of the Chancellor 
and President.
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and a uniting ideal that blinded most Germans to differences 
and dissidents alike.^ Those splinter groups that existed 
after 1933 had little chance of mass support in Nazi Germany 
and remained isolated pockets of resistance.
This is not to say that facto National Socialism was 
a consistent, well-defined ideology or that the Nazi party 
was a united hierarchy, dispensing the Führer * s wishes with­
out alteration of intent or misunderstanding of final objec­
tive. On the contrary, because of the elements and personal­
ities that made up the N.S.D.A.P. were so diverse, the move­
ment was more an emotionally-directed menagerie than a total
■7itarian order. The ideology of Nazism was more developed
See von Schlabrendorff, The Secret War, pp. 23, 24,
29, Again, to maintain this reality, the Gestapo served as 
both a symbol and as a real force in eliminating all resis­
tance. Actually, it did not neutralize all resistance 
groups in Germany immediately (or in some cases, even even­
tually) - -this due mainly to a lack of intelligence informa­
tion leading to the identification and arrest of state 
enemies. But, the Gestapo gave the psychological impression 
that it could liquidate all its unseen enemies, with the 
result that many potential centers of discontent in the 
Wehrmacht (Armed Forces), in industry and labor remained 
undefined or ineffectual.
7As A. J. Ryder stated in his Twentieth Century Germany: 
From Bismarck to Brandt (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1973):
"Yet, within the party, behind the facade of 
total conformity, fierce conflict remained. Among 
leading Nazis the struggle for power or for influ­
ence over the Führer--often the same thing--led to 
bitter rivalry: Himmler against Rohm, Rosenberg 
against Goebbels, Goring against the generals, the 
generals against the Ministry of Economics, later 
Speer against Goring, Himmler against Bormann,
Speer against Sauckel, to mention only some of the
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than Italian fascism, according to Koppel Pinson in his work, 
Modern Germany. But, Pinson also pointed out that Nazi 
ideology could be modified or overruled when expediency dic­
tated. He stated, for example:
...it [National Socialism] did not occupy 
the same position of dogmatic authority 
nor did it receive the same degree of tech­
nical and scholarly implementation that 
Marxism received in the Communist dictator­
ship in Russia....S
Thus, party ideology was flexible, and it was subject to 
divergent interpretations. Socialism for the Nazis, for ex­
ample, was not an economic principle contending to replace 
private industry with public control of the means of produc­
tion. Pinson believed that Hitler considered this distinc­
tion a trifle, that the Führer * s aim was to socialize the 
people, not their industry and property.^
more important...."
Ryder noted a continuing feud between the ideologues in the 
party and the technocrats "who wanted efficiency and a quiet 
life." According to Dr. Ryder, Nazism was no more than 
authoritarian anarchy. The Third Reich did not achieve a 
full totalitarian implementation or even the consistency 
of ideology seen in Soviet Russia in the 1930*s. While 
Ryder is unfair to compare the short development of National 
Socialism (principally if not entirely through Hitler) to 
the much longer gestation period of Communism, pronouncing 
the former unusable and the latter functional, he does have 
a point: Nazi Germany was never as politically efficient, 
all-encompassing or totalitarian as its foreign contempo­
raries believed it to be. The image of Nazi totalitarianism 
was a fabrication of excellent propaganda, for it convinced 
Germans and foreigners alike, 
oPinson, Modern Germany, p. 490.
^Ibid., p. 499.
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Concerning Hitler’s use of expediency in most ideologi­
cal matters (e.g., his rapprochement with big business and 
labor, despite an avowed promise to defend small business), 
Edward N. Peterson in The Limits of Hitler's Power stated:
Hitler's belief in anything other than 
power is difficult to discover in govern­
mental operations. Anti-Semitism would be 
the exception. Yet even here, so strange 
as it seems, no clear course is apparent 
from 1933 to Auschwitz.
On anti-Semitism in Nazi ideology, Hajo Holborn, a Ger­
man emigre who came to the United States after his expulsion 
from teaching in 1933, commented on Hitler's unscrupulous 
use of anti-Semitism and the effect such racial hardening 
would have on the German people:
Hitler's biological materialism excluded 
all ethics. in the pursuit of its struggle 
for power, which is the dictate of the blood, 
the race-conscious people could use any 
means.... He [Hitler] derided the stupidity 
of the bourgeoisie and the old upper classes 
for being hampered by humanitarian scruples.
Only people with a fanatic belief in race 
would be able to fight without being bothered 
by humanitarian and traditionalist inhibitions. 
Hitler readily admitted that such people would 
be barbarians.H
See Edward N. Peterson, The Limits of Hitler's Power 
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1969), p. 10.
On page 4, Peterson explained: "...He [Hitler] was a remote 
umpire, handing down decisions from on high when his under­
lings could not agree, or, almost as frequently, not giving 
a decision, but delaying it until a more propitious occasion, 
which rarely came...." Peterson noted that this is not his 
opinion alone, but that it is shared by Alan Bullock, Helmut 
Heiber, and Hermann Rauschning, who all agree to Hitler's 
bohemian procrastination in decision-making.
11 See Hajo Holborn, A History of Modern Germany 1840-1945 
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf^ 1969), p . 715. While anti-Se mi t i s m
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No matter how inconsistent, uneven or completely vi- 
cissitudinary the Führer * s administration of state was. Hit­
ler's ideological conception of the Nazi as a stereotype 
bearing the cruel characteristics of the Nietzschean super­
man (but none of the individuality) remained unchanged. It 
was a personality Hitler fancied for himself, and incarnated 
in the SS ideal.
Because few leaders in the Nazi hierarchy fit the super­
man image physically and/or mentally, they all compensated 
psychologically by overemphasizing this ideal in their 
speeches and writings. The effect was to provide a common 
ground for competing groups within the Nazi movement: the 
blond, blue-eyed superman--the ideal Aryan type--was applauded 
from all sides as the goal of National Socialism. To provide 
this type with a foundation for its subjugation of Germany, 
Europe and the rest of the world was the only worthwhile func­
tion of National Socialism. Anti-Semitism's direction to the 
eventual elimination of the Jewish question served only to
was an end in itself for Hitler, it also served as National 
Socialism's best tool for psychological conditioning. The 
desired outcome, as A. J. Ryder emphasized in a quote attrib­
uted to Hitler from Jochira Pest's The Face of the Third Reich 
(London, 1970) was: "...My pedagogy is hard.... In my fortress
of the Teutonic Order [i.e., the Ordensburg] a youth will grow 
up before whom the world will tremble. I want a violent, 
domineering, undismayed, cruel youth.... it must bear pain. 
There must be nothing weak and gentle about it. The free 
splendid beast of prey must once more flash from its eyes." 
(See Ryder, Twentieth Century Germany, p. 366.)
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enhance the breeding environment for the superman. It would 
remove all (?) foreign elements and provide the pure condi­
tions necessary for the proper rearing of the superman.
Such bombast was, pathetically, the only concept on 
which Nazis agreed, or to which they consistently paid lip 
service. It was an abstraction that remained unchanged in 
Nazi ideology to the end of the war and Germany’s collapse.
In reality, the ideal was only a focal point for vested in­
terests, both personal and professional. The Nazi party 
would have dissolved had it not triumphed politically, and 
had it not been held together by Hitler until such time that 
industry, labor and the army provided it with the necessary 
forms to harden it into an institution.
A question arises concerning National Socialism and 
German society. To what extent was the latter eroded by the 
former? To what extent did the latter modify the intentions 
and actions of the former, buffering fanatical zeal or check­
ing nihilistic impulses? Perhaps a look at the S3, since it 
was largely after 1933 that it developed, and since it de­
veloped into such an important organization, would be in­
structive .
The SS, as mentioned earlier, rapidly expanded in num­
bers and political force after 1934. Heinrich Himmler, as 
Reichsführer SS and head of the Gestapo, combined police, 
intelligence and para-military units to give the SS a p o ­
litical influence that extended into virtually all areas of
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
40
German life. But to maintain this influence competently, 
Himmler realized that he had to make compromises. The first 
of these was technical: intelligence specialists of the 
Sicherheitsdienst (Security Service) were recruited for 
university degrees and special skills, not just for racial 
characteristics, although initially these standards were 
maintained. (During the war, loosening of standards in the 
SS led to recruitment of Latvians, Russians and even Muslim 
auxiliaries-- the manpower shortage was increasingly severe.)
But Himmler*s greatest desire was to adjust the SS to German 
society, and to make the SS "respectable.” As Hajo Holborn 
observed in his History of Modern Germany:
A good sprinkling of noblemen among the 
commanders of its military units and a 
large number of academically trained peo­
ple, particularly medical doctors [could 
be found in the SS].
Holborn also said that Himmler cultivated social re­
spectability for the SS by "appointing many high government 
officials and industrialists honorary members of the SS. after 
1933."^^ Men like Walter Schellenberg, Reinhard Hohn, Franz
1 2See Holborn, History of Modern Germany, p. 74 8.
1 According to Karl Sailer, Die Rassenlehre des National- 
sozialismus in Wissenschaft und Propaganda (Darmstadt: PrdgreB- 
VerTagT 1961) , p . l05, the SS instituted a SS. Dienstalterliste 
(nobility list) in 1938 that offered the following:
von 16 ObergrupfjenfUhrern waren 3 adelig (noble)
von 61 Gruppenfilhrern..........  5 adelig
von 49 Brigadefuhrern..........  7 adelig
von 217 Oberfuhrern.^............ 19 adelig
und 305 Standartenfilhrern  24 adelig
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Alfred Six and Otto Ohlendorf played parts in the leadership 
of the SD. With the exception of Ohlendorf, these personal­
ities had little in common with Ernst Junger's soldier-worker, 
Nietzsche * s superman or Hitler’s ideal Aryan warlord. Between 
the real and the ideal, the gulf appeared unbridgeable, yet it 
was spanned by propaganda both in films and speeches. A com­
promise in ideals was easily handled. Indeed, the skill with 
which Hitler juggled ideas and made deals became a fundamental 
condition for all Nazi political activity at the highest le- 
elsd^
One result of political maneuvering after 1933 was the 
disillusionment of party fanatics and "old street fighters." 
The situation was very mixed, however. On one hand, the Rohm 
purge was a denial of the old Nazi party, a sacrifice of the 
SA in a deal between Hitler and the Reichswehr (old army).
On the other hand, literally thousands of old party men were 
given patronage all out of proportion to their administrative 
abilities or skills. Ultimately, the arbiter in cases of 
high-level power struggles between personalities was the 
Führer. Adolf Hitler’s moods colored his decisions with in­
consistency.
Edward Peterson suggests in the introduction to his 
work. Limits of Hitler’s Power, p. xiii, that in action the 
Third Reich’s political personalities operated much as their 
counterparts in the Western democracies, using "...force and 
counterforce, conflict, and compromise as in the more public 
power struggles in democratic societies." (See also p. xiv.)
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Probably the best indication of the change in the Nazi 
party was seen in the adjustments it made in the German econ­
omy, and the effects this work had in shifting party power.
It is clear that the Nazis in governing Germany were as much 
changed by the experience as Germany was changed by being 
administrated by the Nazis. The early administration was 
blessed with some huge successes: unemployment was wiped out ; 
industrial production doubled; the Gross National Product 
rose 87 percent in five y e a r s . F o o d  production also in­
creased, according to A. J. Ryder and, as a result of effi­
cient rationing, food supplies during the war were adequate 
to sustain the population of Germany. In 1916-1918, they 
had not been sufficient. There were the Autobahnen (motor­
ways) , praised by Nazi propagandists and acknowledged by 
foreign observers as a great achievement in their own right. 
There was the rapid modernization and expansion of the 
Wehrmacht, together with the creation of Goring*s shining 
star, the Luftwaffe (Air Force). In short, Germany experienced
IS See Ryder, Twentieth Century Germany, p. 345. Ryder's 
figures show a drop in unemployment in Germany from 6 million 
to 3.77 million at the end of 1933. At the same time, indus­
trial production was up 13 percent and income in agriculture 
was up 20 percent. By 1938, unemployment reached a low of 
400,000 and industrial production and the GNP were nearly 
double that of the 1933 level.
^^Ibid., p. 357: "...German population did not exper­
ience the shortage of food it had known in 1916-18. The 
intake of the average civilian remained at or near 2^ 700 
calories a day for most of the war; even during the winter 
of 1944-5 it was about 2,450."
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an economic revival under the Nazis that surpassed that of
any western nation in the Depression era.
But behind these successes there was conflict. Ryder
touched on the state of confusion arising from competing
Nazi agencies:
...Inadequate supplies of steel and other 
materials, of transport and labour were 
competed for by four rival organizations;
Goring’s Four Year Plan office, Thomas in 
the O.K.W., Funk's Ministry of Economics, 
and the Organization Todt which was re­
sponsible for building the new motor 
roads, the fortifications in the West, 
and many other projects.
While this multiplicity of economic organizations allowed 
the Nazis to produce in many areas at once, there was consid­
erable waste and duplication of effort. This was particularly 
true during the first years of the war. Indeed, both Holborn
and Ryder consider Albert Speer to be the crucial resource
1 sthat kept the Reich going after 1942. At the time of Speer’s 
appointment as head of the Organization Todt, there were four 
other competitors for critical war materials. They were:
Goring’s Four Year Plan office, Thomas* O.K.W. Economics and 
Armaments branch. Funk's Ministry of Economics and Seldte's 
Labor Ministry. Initially Speer, with Hitler's approval, made 
inroads into Thomas' and Goring's areas of resource control.
17See Ryder, Twentieth Century Germany, p. 351.
18Author's note: Speer assumed control of the Organiza- 
tion Todt after Dr. Todt ' s death in a plane crash in F'ëb'füary,igrzi
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Then in June .1943, Thomas resigned after being accused of de­
featism and Speer assumed some control of O.K.W. Armaments. 
One year later, Speer had complete authority over armaments 
production for all the services of the Wehrmacht.
Whereas before 1942 Speer’s chief connection with Hit­
ler had been as the "Fuhrer's architect," he now assumed a 
position of central importance at the very highest level of 
leadership under Hitler. As such, the Speer phenomenon can 
only be seen as a triumph of the technocrats over the ide­
ologues. The personality of the party had changed greatly 
in the war years, partly due to the demands on the leadership 
and the economy, and partly due to the failures of several 
key personalities. Hess’ flight to Scotland in 1940 and 
Goring’s failures at Dunkirk, the Battle of Britain and in
supply efforts for Stalingrad all worked to change the tex-
2 0ture of Nazi leadership under Hitler.
^^See A. J. Ryder, Twentieth Century Germany, p. 433. Dr. 
Ryder believed that Speer deserves niiiich of the credit for Ger­
many’s increased war production. In 1944, he noted that pro­
duction of tanks (in tons) was seven times larger than produc­
tion in 1941. While 9,540 aircraft of all kinds were built in 
1941, 34,350 aircraft came off assembly lines in 1944. Between 
1941 and 1944 munitions output tripled, and Speer had cut out 
so much waste and duplication that only "a relatively small 
rise in the consumption of steel and an even more modest ex­
pansion in the numbers employed was noted." Hajo Holborn’s 
figures for the increase in war production coincide with Ry­
der’s statistics, but they differ in determining peak produc­
tion: Ryder says the peak was reached in the fall of 1944 and 
Holborn claims it was reached in June, 1944. (See Ryder, 
Twentieth Century Germany, p. 436; and Holborn, History of 
Modern Germany, p. 756".")
20Rudolf Hess, as Party Secretary and Hitler’s early 
party comrade had flown to Scotland to offer Britain peace
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Central among these changes was Martin Bormann’s control 
of Hitler’s appointments as Party Secretary. Party leaders
t thad an intense hatred for Bormann for isolating the Führer.
As Edward Peterson observed;
Under Bormann the party became much less 
the beerhall crowd going wild during an emo­
tional Hitler speech than the lifeless 
bureaucracy they abhorred....
From Rohm, Hess, Goebbels and Goring the party power 
shifted to Bormann, Himmler and Speer. While ultimate power 
rested with Hitler, this shift was indicative of a maturation 
during the last years of the Reich. The lines of power re­
mained confused and Goring, Goebbels and lesser notables in 
the hierarchy continued to challenge Bormann, Himmler and 
Speer and the technocrats. But the changes in Nazi party 
administration and the directions of National Socialism were 
predicated on the outcome of significant events during the 
war and adaptations demanded by the economic needs of Ger-
terms, quite without Hitler's sanction or knowledge. The 
Führer was furious at this betrayal. Goring as "Second Man 
in the Reich" began losing Hitler’s favor after he failed to 
stop the British evacuation at Dunkirk (an honor he had asked 
for, convincing Hitler that General Heinz Guderian’s Panzer 
were not needed, and should be held back). Though officially 
Hitler’s successor (after 1939), Goring, according to Edward 
Peterson, was eclipsed by Himmler and Bormann by the end of 
1943. (See Peterson, Limits of Hitler's Power, p. 73.)
^Ijbid., p. 435. Peterson stated in his introduction 
(p. xiv): "...the basic assumption is... that Hitler’s power 
was not complete but limited in some way by most of the peo­
ple with whom he had to deal directly or indirectly." Cer­
tainly, Bormann had a key power in determining who would get 
an audience with the Führer.
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many during the whole period, 1933-1945. It is best to note 
here, as Herbert Marcuse would, that with the success of the 
Nazis' conservative revolution, the need for Nazi revolution­
aries ceased. What was needed after 1933 were Nazi bureau­
crats, technicians and professional administrators. The 
shift in power and influence from the old party members to 
the new "Parlor Nazis," careerists and technocrats bears this 
out. The demands Germany put on the Nazis transformed them 
and their party. The adjustment of Germany to National 
Socialism was not one-sided.
We can return to an explanation of how German society 
was changed or eroded by National Socialism, and to what de­
gree the Nazis were accepted, supported and obeyed. For this 
analysis, the author will concentrate on the positions held 
by Hajo Holborn, A. J. Ryder, Edward N. Peterson, Hans Kohn, 
and Koppel S. Pinson. In no way does the author consider 
these five sources as exclusive or definitive, but they do 
offer a "moderate" historical analysis of the German adjust­
ment to Nazism.
Koppel Pinson is aligned closely with Hans Kohn in his
2 2views and the two historians can be taken together. Both 
emphasize the influence of Ernst Junger and Oswald Spengler
2 2Pinson stated in his introduction to Modern Germany, 
p. X, that his position was most strongly influenced by 
"Professor Hans Kohn, who by personal contact as well as 
by his published works has helped to give direction as well 
as stimulation to much of my thinking."
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on young intellectuals in the postwar era. While Kohn and 
Pinson saw the revolt against reason as an especially German 
reaction to humanism, liberalism and the Enlightenment, Kohn 
was the first to declare:
National Socialism was as little the 
natural or logical outcome of German his­
tory as Leninism was of Russian history.
There is no inevitability in history....
However, Communism and National Socialism 
were made possible by the historical and 
political traditions of the two nations 
involved--not by what they had in common 
with the West but by what separated their 
intellectual and social development from 
that of the West.23
This separation occurred at the end of the Napoleonic 
wars but probably even before Waterloo. Kohn saw a conscious 
deviation in German thought after 1812. With the liberation 
of the German states from French control, the Germans appeared 
to turn into "a dynamic nation whose will centered upon power 
and the power state.” While westerners "distrusted and feared 
its abuse,” Germans ”felt an almost religious reverence for 
p o w e r . F i c h t e ,  Hegel and Marx are seen as leading thinkers
2 3See Hans Kohn, Mind of Germany (New York: Charles 
Scribner’s Sons, 1960), pp. 8, 9. On page 490 of his Modern 
Germany, Pinson wrote : "...National Socialism represented
the most extreme manifestation of the twentieth century re­
volt against reason. Its basic psychological character was 
anti - intellectualism. Instead of reason, it founded its 
entire ideological structure on the appeal to emotion and 
the appeal to force.”
24See Kohn, M ind of Germany, p. 10. At the same time, 
Kohn admits that üermany's disjointed political condition 
made this preoccupation with the power state no more than an 
esoteric exercise, until Prussia’s ascendancy in the I860’s.
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preoccupied with the nation, the economy and the state, and 
their writings eulogized the state as a self-fulfilling en­
tity- - according to Kohn. Whereas westerners moved away from 
authoritarian concepts, the Germans identified with these 
ideas and elevated them to a philosophical level. Kohn con­
cluded that Germany experienced several generations of anti- 
Western and anti-intellectual thought before Hitler, and that 
German intellectuals were attracted by the Nazis' avowed 
nihilism, Geist und Macht (spirit and power), and identifica­
tion with radical authoritarianism as the principle means of 
fulfilling Germany's historical mission.
The collapse of 1918 only brought these desires into 
focus. The popularity of Spengler's Decline of the West and 
Junger's work has been mentioned. Kohn believed that the 
Front Generation was bitterly contemptuous. Germany had been 
separated from the West for generations, but the Front Genera­
tion separated itself from German society and even Christian- 
2 ̂ity. Pinson agreed with all of this, noting that the Nazis' 
frank brutality was attractive to the Front Generation and to
some of the younger generation who did not experience the war 
on the battlefield. In typifying the atmosphere that the
^^Ibid., p. 13.
Author's note; Others among the younger generation 
were also part of the Front Generation--they had seen ser­
vice in France in 1918 when some of them were only fourteen 
or fifteen years old.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
4 9
Nazis were trying to create, Pinson noted:
...The thirteen years of Nazi rule opened 
up a chasm of primitive drives and animalic 
forces that seem to separate the world before
and after Hitler by a time span of thousands
of years.27
Indeed, initially this is what Nazi fanatics wanted most 
from their conservative revolution. The triumph of National 
Socialism would mean the defeat of the Bourgeoisie, the wast­
ing away of the Church, the elimination of weak-kneed intel­
lectuals and financially privileged classes, and the ascen­
dancy of neo-feudal ism. The SA (Sturm Abteilung or "Storm 
Division") man was to be the archetypal proletarian barbar­
ian- -strong, hard and cruel. The flow of emotions was toward 
the nihilistic. If in the pursuit of conquest Germany was
destroyed, it would include everything and everyone in that
destruction. As Pinson explained:
Nazi demands could never be satisfied 
because "being satisfied" ran counter to 
the entire spirit of the movement.28
But Edward Peterson believed that after 1934 the Nazi
party was not motivated by fanatics (other than Hitler). It
was an illusion that the party was a center for fanatical
29sacrifices. The "sacrifices" were words, not actions. Like
2 7See Pinson, Modern Germany, p. 479.
^^Ibid., p. 490.
7QSee Peterson, Limits of Hitler’s Power, p. 433. The 
mellowing influences of success even reached the Gestapo, 
for as Peterson said, the Gestapo was a terror weapon seldom 
used "against anyone of status, the party powerful, or any 
of the powerful of state, army or industry, although Hitler
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wise, it was Peterson's opinion that before World War II, the 
Nazis made few political demands on the German adult popula­
tion, so much so that the horrors of the death camps in the
30East came as a complete surprise to many. Peterson contended 
that the Germans were far less eager to pursue the directives 
of the party and Hitler than foreign observers believed dur­
ing the war. He stated:
If nothing else, one passively drags one's 
feet, a reason why Germany was at its slow-, 
est in 1939-42 in preparing for total war.
This statement may or may not be true, but Peterson's 
views (as demonstrated in this and earlier segments) indi­
cated the believable middle ground between complete political 
non-involvement by the Germans in Nazi matters, and the prop­
agandists' boastings of Bin Volk, ein Reich, ein Führer. 
Peterson believed, and the author tends to agree, that the
had few illusions that these men were really committed to 
him...."
^^Peterson noted in Limits of Hitler's Power, p. 443: 
"...the state, until the war, made few demands on adults, 
except for public silence. Privately one could tell jokes 
and complain. Children were more exposed to society's de­
mands, but this is true wherever there is a compulsory educa­
tion. Hitler deliberately avoided asking too much. The post­
war evidence of horrible excesses of the NS outside Germany 
came as a double surprise to many Germans who had observed 
the compromises Hitler found necessary with them."
31 Ibid., p. 449. Author's note: While I do not deny 
that human laziness was a tendency in Nazi Germany as it is 
in any system, I disagree with Peterson that Germany's pro­
duction rate was slowed because of it. Speer's continued ap­
peals to Hitler for total war mobilization of manpower (to­
gether with an increase in the women's labor force) finally 
led to the necessary directives which Speer implemented with 
great success, even during the heaviest Allied bombing.
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majority of Germans and even a majority of Nazis proclaimed 
their loyalty, but privately disregarded Reich directives.
While an erosion of old public standards by Nazism was 
visible in the Third Reich, the framework of pre-Nazi Ger­
many remained sound under the cloak of Nazism. This is under­
standable only if one agrees with Kohn and Pinson that many 
elements of German tradition were co-opted in the Nazi view 
of authoritarianism, militarism, racism and devotion to the 
power of the state. It does not mean that Nazi atrocities 
were the logical culmination of German history or German 
social ethics. As Peterson observed, some historians trace 
the origins of Mein Kampf (my fight) to Charles Darwin and
Social Darwinism, but it "seems more historically accurate
32to find the origin in a trench, not in a book."
A. J. Ryder and Hajo Holborn dealt with the subject of 
German accommodation to Nazism and the subject of intellectual 
adjustment within the German university. Ryder spoke for the 
traditionalist position when he suggested:
The readiness with which the bulk of the 
German people adjusted themselves to Hitler’s 
dictatorship suggests a deeper explanation 
than mere susceptibility to propaganda or 
even intimidation. It indicates a psycho­
logical predisposition that was more than 
willing to respond to the highly emotional 
appeal to a charismatic l e a d e r . 33
^ ^ I b i d . , p .  1 2 .
33See Ryder, Twentieth Century Germany, p. 309. German 
intellectuals were not much different from their countrymen 
in this respect. There were exceptions to the emigration of
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
52
Ryder touched on the purge of the universities, which 
varied with the institution and faculty. The scholars' pas­
sive acceptance of the removal of Jewish and politically 
undesirable Aryan educators was equal to their indifference 
to their assigned role as "ideological soldiers" of Nazi 
culture who would see self-interested research as "out of 
date, relics of a discredited l i b e r a l i s m . I t  is Holborn, 
however, who fills in many of the gaps in Ryder's descrip­
tion of the adjustment.
First, the election of the German president, while a
matter of popular vote, bore no similarity to the election
of an American president. Traditionally, the Germans were
likely to elect an outstanding bureaucrat or soldier, free
35of party concerns, instead of a party man. As evidence, 
Holborn can submit the fact that Paul von Hindenburg was the
the intelligentsia after 1933 that are notable. As Ryder 
observed: "...Among them were Gerhart Hauptmann, the
veteran playwright whose early ties had been with the
socialists and who had been especially honoured by the Re­
public. Hauptmann offered Hitler his enthusiastic support. 
So did Heidegger, the philosopher, who as Principal of 
Freiburg University told his students: 'The Führer, himself 
and alone, is the present and future reality of Germany and 
its laws.' Richard Strauss, the composer, became the first 
President of the Reich Chamber of Music." See Ryder, Twen­
tieth Century Germany, p. 358.
^^Ibid., p. 360.
See Holborn, History of Modern Germany, p. 5 48. The
American presidency is usuaTly filled by a Republican or 
Democrat who, Holborn believed, "is unable to be above par­
ties, let alone oppose party government."
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Weimar Republic's president--hardly a "republican" choice 
for the office. The trend in German politics was to the 
anti-republican, both among the Communists on the left and 
the neo-conservative parties on the right. As Holborn said 
of Weimar near its close:
To the great mass of the anti-republicans 
no problem existed. To them there was no 
question but that the Nazi party, which 
called itself a "movement" rather than a 
party, was the final rally of the German 
people against liberalism, democracy, 
capitalism, and their ruinous conse­
quences. 36
Holborn sees the neo-conservatives as prime movers in 
the political activation of students and the older intelli­
gentsia. The Junger parallel was emphasized by Holborn as it 
was by Kohn and Pinson. Likewise, Holborn agreed that there 
was a philosophical gap between German and Western thought,
and that German intellectuals prided themselves on their
37isolation from the West.
Ibid., p. 660. Of course, Holborn is excluding the 
Communists from this particular anti-republican feeling.
37 Ibid., p. 665. On the same page Holborn also said: 
"...The intellectuals were entirely unconcerned over the 
widening gulf between German and Western European-American 
thought. On the contrary, Germany's isolation appeared to 
them desirable. This separation was finally carried over 
to the basic moral principles of Western civilization. It 
is true that few of the intellectuals went to this length 
...Spengler's crude statement that he was on the side of 
'blood against spirit' was one of the early demonstrations 
of the eclipse of the German intelligentsia in the moral 
leadership of the people."
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Holbojn steps back to modify his position on the intel­
lectual's political significance in Weimar Germany. First, 
Wiemar did not change the German university significantly.
As in the Wilhelminian period, the universities ruled them­
selves and were administered by conservative faculties. The 
power of these faculties was even stronger during the Weimar 
period, due to the Republic's fundamental inconstancy and 
weakness. Secondly, while the German professor was a re­
spected individual, he did not have any political power out­
side the university, and his academic specialization, com­
pounded by political ignorance, dissuaded him from becoming 
more than a follower, in the political sense. Finally, over­
crowding in German universities led to less contact between 
professor and student ; when the student corps filled the 
vacuum in the student-professor relationship, it took over
responsibility for the political indoctrination of the stu- 
3 8dent. Holborn concluded:
...it [the German university] chiefly pro­
duced men proficient in special skills or 
special knowledge but lacking not only in 
the most primitive preparation for civic 
responsibility but also a canon of absolute 
ethical commitments.
Ibid., pp. 653, 654, 656. Holborn believed that most 
German academicians kept politics out of their lectures. He 
contended that politics had little bearing on the quality of 
work in the sciences. The humanities and social sciences 
were another matter, but Holborn believed that their decline 
was due less to political boredom than to losses in the First 
World War.
39 Ibid., p. 813.
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Thus, in answer to the question: how was German society 
changed by National Socialism, the erosion of German society 
seemed most pronounced on the ethical scale. At least on 
the surface, the Germans were condemned for lacking the moral 
courage to overthrow Hitler. But as we see here, the Nazis 
did not begin the ethical or moral erosion of German culture. 
Rather, this decline predates the Nazis by an indefinite num­
ber of years.
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CHAPTER V
PROPAGATION OF THE NAZI STATE;
SCHOOLS AND THE SS
To insure enforcement of the Reich's Laws as Hitler dic­
tated, the office of Secret Police (Geheime Staatspolizei, or 
Gestapo) was established in April 1933. It was transformed 
into a special police force in November 1933.  ̂ The proce­
dural cooperation between the Gestapo and the Administrative 
Court system made the entire German legal apparatus a genuine 
extension of the Führer's hand for terror or coercion, since 
arrest by the Gestapo usually meant conviction in the courts. 
The pervasiveness of the Gestapo's jurisdiction could be
coupled to the omnipresent SS (Schutzstaffel) which, by 1936,
2had grown in size to 100,000 men. If there were any doubts 
in the German public’s mind as to Hitler's complete control of 
Germany, by 1936 these doubts had disappeared.
The Gestapo * s general powers were not outlined formally 
until a Prussian statute defined these powers on February 10, 
1936. (See Ernst Fraenkel, The Dual State (New York: Octagon 
Books, 1969), p. 9.
2111 fact, most Germans made little distinction between 
the branches of the Gestapo and the SS because both organiza­
tions were under the direction of Heinrich Himmler, who an­
swered only to Hitler. (See Lowie, Toward Understanding Ger­
many, p. 52.)
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But control without continued support from at least a 
portion of the German population would be short-lived. Hit­
ler realized that the future of Nazi Germany rested with its 
children and what they would make of the Führer's legacy.
With no particular originality Hitler decided that at the 
outset of his rule, German education would have to be coor­
dinated for the benefit of National Socialism and its prop­
agation ,
History books were rewritten and educational priorities 
readjusted. In nominal agreement with Hitler’s scattered 
outline for education, physical education was given first 
priority. Character development and assimilation of ’’use­
ful" knowledge were the second and third goals of primary 
education. By the time a child had reached Gymnasium age, 
his individual strengths were developed to a stage of 
specialization, theoretically, that would indicate his future 
career field. The Gymnasium and other more technical schools 
were to intensify their specialized curricula to capitalize 
on the individual’s strengths, limiting his studies to his
3strongest abilities.
3As Karl Dietrich Bracher noted in The German Dictator­
ship , p. 26 2:
"In principle this goal [i.e., Nazification of Ger­
man education and history] was achieved in 1933.
Just as teachers and parents capitulated to the pres­
sures of the regime, so on the whole did the indoc­
trination of youth succeed. The young, who were 
receptive to heroic legend and black-and-white over­
simplifications, were handed over to the stupendous 
shows of the regime.... The teacher, fearful of his
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To guarantee a supply of future Nazi leaders, the 
Nationalpolitische Erziehungsanstalten (National Approved 
Political) or Napola schools were created by the Ministry 
of Education in April 1933. Given equivalent rank with the 
Gymnasium, but greater political status, the Napola school 
resembled, as its name suggested, a political leadership 
school.  ̂ In addition, the Adolf Hitler Schools and the 
Ordensburgen (Castles of Order) were created to complement 
the Napolas, providing specialized Nazi indoctrination from
5primary through college levels.
For those young Germans desiring more traditional educa­
tion opportunities, the party tried to apply pressure to in­
sure cooperation from the universities and technical schools.^
civil-service status and subject to denunciation by 
pupils and parents alike, was rapidly coordinated."
^In 1936, the Napola schools came under SS control. The 
Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Oberschule at Feldafing was 
the Napola* s only official competitor; it took students only 
"from the ranks of proven Party members." (See Schoenbaum, 
Hitler's Social Revolution, pp. 277, 278.) By 1938, there 
were twenty-one Napola schools, including four in Austria and 
one in the Sudetenland.
^See Val Dean Rust's German Interest in Foreign Educa­
tion Since World War I (Ann Arbor, Mich.: Malloy Lithoprint­
ing, Inc., 1965), p. 111. The Adolf Hitler Schools were based 
on the "Country Home School" project engineered by Alfred 
Andreesen, a leader in Germany's foreign education research. 
Andreesen recommended use of the Leitz education form, sim­
ilar to the English Public Schools System. Hitler accepted 
Andreesen's plan and it was used in the Adolf Hitler Schools.
^See Kuhn et al., Die deutsche Universitat im Dritten 
Reich, p. 80.
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Party pressure worked two ways: (1) to open university doors 
to young Nazi leaders; and (2) to close them to the "selfish" 
intellectual whose anemic record of political participation 
and leadership disqualified him from political leadership.
The same pressures could be applied more effectively to 
the university graduate looking for civil service employment. 
Harsh realities dictated that the young German intellectual 
accommodate himself to the Nazis, or give up his education 
and career. If the alternative to active participation in 
Nazi activities was mediocrity or failure, the German intel­
lectual would choose the party. Ambition usually succeeded 
where indoctrination could not; applying this rule, the pro­
ponents of National Socialism gained far more than they bar­
gained for: by satisfying ambition, they recruited active 
intelligence. By indoctrination, they had amassed only blind 
loyalty.
The SS, with its reputation as an elite corps, proved 
a powerful temptation to young university graduates seeking 
party employment. More than flashy uniforms and on-campus 
recruitment, the SS offered special training and assignments 
that were particularly attractive to the young intellectual. 
The Allgemeine or "General" SS took a special interest in 
research investigaton, ranging from archeology and biology
7to security investigation and foreign intelligence. Their
7In Hitler's Social Revolution, pp. 236 and 237, Schoen­
baum stated: "Meanwhile university graduates, the traditional
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8demand for university graduates was understandably high.
In addition, the SS had high social status as one of the 
most important organizations in the party.
The alert young intellectual observed that the SS was 
a functional, steadily growing organization that had 
eclipsed the SA in power since the Rohm purge of June 30, 
1934. In the final analysis, the SS was the wave of the 
future in Nazi Germany: it was the Führer * s personal guard 
and a major tool of political power within the party and 
Germany as a whole. The ambitious university graduate rec­
ognized this fact and often accepted SS recruitment as the 
first step in his private rise to power in the Nazi party.
The SS of 1939 was a far different organization than 
the tiny fanatical Schutzstaffel Guard of 1929. Its size 
was made manageable by the diversification of its branches, 
its armies of technical and cultural specialists, linguists.
source of civil service recruitment, continued as before to 
go into the civil administration...they tended to gravitate 
to the centers of speedy promotion and growing influence 
like the propaganda and Interior Ministries, rather than 
the more traditional administrative centers."
^Himmler's vision of the SS reinforced the organiza­
tion's propaganda image, but as Schoenbaum noted on page 291 
of Hitler's Social Revolution, Himmler's reveries were brought 
down to earth by the requirements of reality: "From beginning
to end, Himmler preached 'racial' elitism, presided--as he saw 
it--over by a new knightly order, [He] dreamed of feudal do­
mains, new gods, a state of nature. At the same time, his 
policy precluded anything of the sort. Institutional survival 
in an industrial society requires administrators, not knights; 
diplomas, not blue eyes, Himmler consequently recruited ad­
ministrators and diplomas,"
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and scientists. The SS's reputation for fanaticism and in­
doctrination was counterbalanced by its special branches' 
reservoirs of intellectual talents. In some instances, the 
actual results of SS indoctrination showed far less apprecia­
tion for racial dogma than simple interest in making the best 
of one's SS career.^ The intellectual character of the new 
SS was mirrored in its leadership and the academic atmosphere 
surrounding many of the Schutzstaffel*s departments.^^
But within the SS organization, the SD (Sicherheitsdienst) 
was a breeding ground for the intellectual's personal schizo­
phrenia. Here, the intellectual's sense of honor and duty
Heinz Hohne noted in The Order of the Death's Head (New 
York : Coward McCann, Inc., 1970), p . 155 :
"The RUSHA Educational officers were always com­
plaining of the Verfugungstruppe's lack of interest 
in ideology and even the Allgemeine S.S. tended to 
yawn.... In January 1939 Standartenfuhrer Dr. Casar,
Head of the S.S. Educational Office, complained that 
racial policy instructions was making little impact 
on S.S. men -- 'Boredom with these subjects is grad­
ually becoming noticeable among the men'."
^^On page 216 of The Order of the Death's Head, Hohne 
stated:
"With few exceptions the heads of all the impor­
tant Zentralabteilungen and Hauptabteilungen were 
academics holding a degree; the Zentralabetilung 
'Organization' was under Wilhelm Albert, who had 
an engineering degree, Hauptabteilung 'Staff Duties' 
under Dr. Herbert Mehlhorn, a lawyer and economist, 
the Zentralabteilung 'Ideological Combatting of Op­
position' under Professor Franz Six, the Zentral­
abteilung 'Reports on Spheres of German Life' under 
Professor Reinhard Hohn and the Zentralabteilung 
'Counter-Espionage Enemy Intelligence Services' 
under S,S. Oberfuhrer Heinz Jost."
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was complicated by the hidiousness he saw, and the atrocities 
he would be asked to commit.
The SD was the intelligence and special investigations 
branch of the SS and it was in a position to know what went 
on in almost every area inside the party. Both its outer 
offices and headquarters were heavily staffed with respect­
able young intellectuals. Businessmen, municipal officials, 
professors and scientists were some of the SB's best intel­
ligence contacts. Thus, the organization's informers and 
spies added a curious respectability to the SD network.
Having accepted National Socialism as a crusade for the 
salvation of the German race, the SD intellectual considered 
his work an essential part of a great cause. It was respect­
able, even honorable, work.
The SD personnel were exposed to realities of National 
Socialism in its crudest form: mob violence against Jews. 
Disgusted with this senseless brutality, the SD formulated 
its first solution to the "Jewish Problem." Articulated by
Despite the romantic visions of undercover work dreamed 
by the SD recruits, Hohne noted on page 217 of The Order of 
the Death's Head:
"These secret service intellectuals showed a 
curious maidenly aversion to the word 'spy,*.
Schlierbach, the theorist on police work who was 
closely connected with the S.D., wrote that it 
would be 'unworthy of the National-Socialist State 
to make use of spies and agents.,..' Only at a 
later stage, when the intellectuals had long since 
lost their scruples, did Walter Schellenberg put 
some order into the contact system; from then on 
every Headquarters knew its contact men."
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SS Untersturmfuhrer Elder von Mildenstein, the SD plan called 
for a government-supervised emigration of all German Jews to 
Palestine. What was inherent in the SB's attitude was a de­
sire to solve the so-called Jewish problem in a cold, rational 
manner. This precluded mob violence as a rational alterna­
tive, and on June 5, 1935, the Schwarze Korps declared:
The National Socialist Movement and its State 
opposes those criminal machinations [i.e., 
inciting mob violence against the Jews] with 
all its energy. The Party will not tolerate 
prostitution of its sacred struggle for the 
good of the nation by street riots and de­
struction of property.
The SB's official criticism of mob action was indirectly 
aimed at the Party Old Guard and was a precursor of future dis­
agreements between the old street fighters and the new elite. 
Intra-Party friction increased when intellectuals within the 
SD took upon themselves the responsibility of "thought police 
for the Reich." Instead of reporting to the Gestapo, the S B ’s 
leaders were now ordering investigations of Gestapo personnel, 
and maintaining surveillance of any Nazi leaders they con­
sidered suspicious. Combining professional ambition with 
idealism, Sicherheitsdienst authorities proudly declared their 
mission to improve the Nazi state, police its intrigues and
Hohne noted in his explanation of the SB's reaction 
(ibid., p. 328): "The S.D. intellectuals wanted to be thought 
radical National Socialists, but they also wanted to be re­
garded as 'decent' and this type of anti-Jewish action [i.e., 
Streicher's Sturmer crusade] seemed to them harmful anti- 
Semitism."
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denounce its excesses.
The SS offered its intellectuals a precious right, 
scarcely seen in the party and never exercised outside the 
Nazi hierarchy. This was the right to criticize party offi 
cials, denounce opponents within the party leadership, and 
debate the feasibility of Ministry programs and plans. 
Naturally prudence had to be exercised, but the top-level 
SS or SD administrator answered to only a half-dozen supe­
riors, including the Führer himself. Even the SD intellec­
tual of lower rank had the recourse of complaining to his 
immediate superior.
The academic atmosphere of the SD was conducive to 
reasoned argument and low-key debate. Blind obedience to 
orders was unnatural there, and mechanical responses were 
out of place. In the final analysis, the SD intellectual 
was a specialist and a professional. Both these qualifica­
tions meant that he complied with orders instead of obeying 
them. Superficially, the distinction between obedience and 
compliance was small, even undetectable. Rather, it was a 
psychological difference separating the intellectual's ac­
tions from the reactions of a common herd. Compliance with
The SD went as far as to suggest that a one-man dic­
tatorship should obey some rational concept. According to 
Hohne (ibid., p. 212): "Domination, power for its own sake, 
became a new ethical norm, a duty to be performed by a self­
elected elite, which had long since outgrown the plebeian 
National Socialism of the Party veterans."
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orders meant a mind had to be involved in the accomplishment 
of the deed. Principles had to be weighed with intelligence 
and conscience before the proposal was accepted or rejected. 
The action, whatever it might be, had been reasoned.
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CHAPTER VI
ftACADEMICIANS: DIB BRAUNE UNIVERSITAT
On the personal level, how did academicians react to 
their "coordination" by the Nazis? It must be remembered 
that collaboration was a personal matter for the German 
intellectual, whether he worked in some obscure corner of 
a university laboratory or presented his lectures to hun­
dreds of students. Officially, the goal of learning in Ger­
many had changed. Could the professors now wholeheartedly 
dedicate themselves to political education when they had 
heretofore escaped into self-interested scholarship?
In 1964, Rolf Seeliger published the first volume in a 
series entitled Die Braune Universitat (The Brown University) 
which was subtitled "German Teachers Yesterday and Today."
As the title suggests, the series was about National Socialism 
in German universities in the Nazi era. Seeliger endeavored 
to secure as much information as possible on university arti­
cles, dissertations and other works by academicians, to pre­
sent this material in a selective manner (complete with quoted 
excerpts) and to allow the author or authors an opportunity to 
reply, comment or criticize his handling of their work.
66
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By way of criticism, it must be said that Seeliger used 
a **shot-gun" approach. That is to say, his choice of sub­
jects was made on a purely random basis. All shared Seeliger’s 
requirements of teaching experience in Nazi Germany, recent 
teaching experience in Germany, and some direct connection 
with Nazi organizations, articles, or research projects. The 
degree of involvement appears not to have been the crucial 
factor in Seeliger's analyses. He refused to categorize 
beyond his initial requirements. The division into volumes 
of Die Braune Universitat is arbitrary, and more a matter of 
publication dates than subject unity. While roughly 40 per­
cent of his subjects made no response (Seeliger counted thirty- 
three replies among fifty-four professors and lecturers chosen 
for his series), the Stellungnahmen (replies) given by the ma­
jority ranged from notational corrections and clarifications 
of context to short confessions, denials and even short essays 
on their experiences of Nazification of the German university.
The resulting work is an uneven collection of challenges 
and replies. One wonders how greatly Die Braune Universitat 
might have been improved if Seeliger had interviewed his sub­
jects personally, getting specific answers to his very direct 
questions. Nevertheless, the work offers a wealth of sponta­
neity and candor from scholars whose skills ranged from law 
and theology to literature and philosophy. The series is not 
limited to academicians of a specific age or rank-- the Assis-
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tant. Ordinary professor, and Professor of 1933-1945 are 
all represented, though in a scattered assortment. Seeliger's 
strength is his brevity of comment, which is framed as a sort 
of challenge to his subjects. Occasionally, this technique 
takes on the trappings of a full indictment, with pyrotechni- 
cal results. Dr. Andreas Predohl, for example, replied 
scathingly:
You did not do a service to your sub­
ject when you made the same error that the 
occupation powers did: namely, lumping
everyone who somehow had a functioning 
position in the Nazi era into the same 
boat with the real Nazis. The German uni­
versities, which are always being criti­
cized, were never as "brown" as you make 
them out to be.^
Each volume of Die Braune Universitat begins with a 
statement of some aspect of Nazification in the German uni­
versity. These prefaces are of a very general sort, but they 
are reinforced with footnotes and quotations. In volume 5, 
Seeliger produced a significant piece on doctoral degrees and 
their legitimacy in the Nazi era. He followed it up convinc­
ingly with a short biography of Dr. Franz Six. Since both 
Hans Maier and Wolfgang Kunkel agree that the Dozenten (assis­
tants) of the 1930's had a significant role in the Gleichschal- 
tung of the universities, a look at Seeliger*s position on this 
subject is appropriate.
^Rolf Seeliger, Die Braune Universitat, 6 vols. (Munich: 
Verlag Rolf Seeliger, 1968), 6:74.
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According to Seeliger, the question of doctoral degree 
validity during the years of the Nazi era was prompted by 
the fact that dissertations on race theory and anti-Semitism 
were accepted as legitimate theses for doctoral candidates. 
Concerning these degrees, Seeliger quoted the "Sozialdemokra- 
tische Pressdienst" (Social Democratic Press Service), Bonn, 
November 2, 1965:
The deprivation of some doctoral degrees 
raised another problem that had to be faced 
by the universities, scholars and officials.
There is a number of people who in the Nazi 
era received doctoral degrees for disserta­
tions whose contents were then considered 
legitimate scientific research. The afore­
mentioned "doctors" engaged in pseudo­
scientific propaganda theses that a real 
scientific investigation would show to be 
worthless. The racial wisdom of these "Nazi 
theoreticians" have a really criminal aspect.
People who agreed with these polite "theories" 
may not have shared in the bloody work of the 
extermination squads...but when a simple SS. 
man like Schulze read the racial outpourings 
of the "learned" doctors, it is no wonder 
that he used them as his authority to throw 
away his last scruples.
Thus, there is some confusion today as to whom the gen­
uinely legitimate degrees belong, among the many Doktor-Grade 
(doctorates) given between 1933 and 1945. It should be e m ­
phasized that the dissertation, whatever its subject matter, 
was not the sole creation of the candidate. It was also the 
product of the faculty and was directed and blessed by the
^Seeliger, "Doktorarbeiten im Dritten Reich," Die Braune 
Universitat, 5:6,7.
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3candidate's committee.
Seeliger indicates that the dissertation was a career 
vehicle for the aspiring scholar (as it always had been) but 
that the political aspect of a National Socialist-oriented 
thesis carried the scholar into a more political, less aca­
demic career. ̂  In volume 5, Seeliger gives tv/elve examples 
of dissertations completed during the Nazizeit. The topics 
range from "Die Gestalt des Juden auf der neueren deutschen 
Buhne" (The Shape of the Jews under the new German Platform) 
by Elizabeth Frenzel (1940) to "Die Einheit der Publizistik 
und ihre geistigen Grundlagen" (The Unity of Publicity and 
its Spiritual Foundations) by Hermann Franz Gerhard Starke 
(1939). Seeliger's references to chapters of these works-- 
based on direct quotes--received mixed replies from their 
authors. Dissertation committees were emphasized as co­
authors who were partially responsible. Six of the authors 
failed to reply or chose not to reply. Among the disserta­
tions selected was Franz Alfred Six's thesis. While Six was 
certainly an extraordinary figure with an unusual career, 
his dissertation, "Die politische Propaganda der NSDAP im
Seeliger quoted Professor D. Helmut Gollwitzer from a 
personal interview he had with him: "A doctoral disserta­
tion is not merely the private work of its author ; it is 
also the offering of the faculty under whose authority it 
was undertaken." (Die Braune Universitat, 5:10.)
^Seeliger said: "For many, the dissertation was the
first step in a Nazi leader's career." (Ibid., 5:12.)
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Kampf um die Macht" (Political Propaganda of the N.S.D.A.P.
in the Struggle for Power) (1936), contained many of the
vulgarisms and rhetorical cliches of Nazi street propaganda.^
For example, in a chapter entitled, "Das Grinsen des
kommunistischen Untermenschen" (The Sneer of the Communist
Sub-humans), Six harangued:
...The East Galician, the fat greasy Jew, 
the big shot, the Social Democrat blow- 
hards and the sneering communist sub-humans 
had themselves to thank for the enlighten­
ment of the National Socialist movement 
soon buried in the memory of the masses.
Where the word Bourgeois rang, "big shot" 
echoed.6
Trite demonstrations of this sort were replaced with more 
serious comments, often with hidden meaning barely under the
Franz Alfred Six was born in 1909 in Mannheim. He 
studied general statecraft, sociology, history, literary his­
tory and current affairs at the University of Heidelberg. He 
joined the N.S.D.A.P. in 1930 and became an SA SturmfUhrer, 
but transferred to the SS in 1935. He was a section leader 
in SD Security Police and became an SS Standartenführer in 
1938 (also, an SS Oberfuhrer in 1941). After brief tours on 
Himmler’s staff. Six became an SS Einsatzgruppenchef. Six 
also had an academic career that p a r a l l e l ^  his SS life--each 
benefited the other. He was a Priyatdozent (Assistant) at 
the University of Koenigsberg and became an extraordinary 
professor in 1939. As an ordinary professor in foreign poli­
tics and deacon of the Foreign Education faculty at the U ni­
versity of Berlin, he was named as the future chief of Secu­
rity Police for the SD for England in "Operation Sea Lion." 
Six was sentenced to twenty years imprisonment at Nuremberg, 
but was released in 1952. He died sometime before Die Braune 
Universitat was published. (See Seeliger, Die Braune Univer­
sité t , 5:6 5.
^Ibid., 5:64.
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surface. Six’s chapter "SA/SS: Ihr Sterben war Propaganda 
der Tat" (SA/SS: Their Dying was an Act of Propaganda) hit 
an exposed nerve with the SS veterans and the SA survivors 
of the "Night of the Long Knives. Six stated:
In their behavior and their discipline 
the SA. man and the SS. man (the latter in 
his special actions) were the outer mani­
festation of the National Socialist world 
idea, the incarnation of the strength of 
the National Socialist movement. The great 
activity and force of the SA. and SS. lay 
in their courageous acts and services..the 
dying of hundreds from the formations was a 
sacrificial act that could only come from 
the strength of conviction and the power of 
the spirit.... Their dying was an act of 
propaganda, a testimony to the power of an 
idea and a movement.8
The degree of subjugation and downgrading of scholarship 
that the German university tolerated is clear. Franz Six 
was a special case because of his SS connections, but prefer­
ential treatment and speedy teaching promotions were by no 
means limited to him. As other examples of Nazi careerists 
given special recognition, Seeliger cited Rudolf Buchner,^
"Night of the Long Knives" refers to the Rohm purge 
of June 30, 1934 in which hundreds of SA leaders were shot 
by SS execution squads.
8 nSee Seeliger, Die Braune Universitat, 5:64. It is in­
teresting to note that Six keenly observed which organiza­
tions sacrificed more--the SA or the SS. He transferred to 
the SS in 1935.
^See Seeliger, Die Braune Universitat, 3:34, 35. Rudolf 
Buchner was born in Berlin in 1908. He was an Assistant in 
philosophy at the University of Hamburg in 1936. His Aryan 
stance got him a position at the Sonthofen Ordensburg as an 
"Erzieher und Dozent am Erzieherseminar der Adolf-Hitler-
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Konrad Meyer^^ and Fritz Baur.^^
Both Fritz Baur and Rudolf Buchner replied in Stellung- 
nahmen» but Konrad Meyer did not reply. Dr. Baur clarified, 
but did not deny Seeliger’s statements of his association 
with the SS. Dr. Buchner accounted for the eleven year gap 
in his career (between 1945 and 1956) as a procedural affair.
Schulen.” In 1941, he came to the University of Munich as 
an Assistant, a position he held until the end of the war.
In 1956, he was again an Assistant, this time at the Univer­
sity of Wurzburg, and in 1958 he became an auBerplanmaBiger 
Professor at that institution. When Seeliger's third volume 
came out, Buchner was teaching middle and recent history at 
the Julius-Maximilians-Universitat in Wurzburg.
^^See Seeliger, Die Braune Universitat, 2:38-40. Konrad 
Meyer, a doctor of agriculture and land distribution, was 
born in Salzderhelden/Kreis Einbeclc in 1901. Between 1934 
and 1945 he was an ordinary professor and director of the 
Institut fur Agrarwesen und Agrarpolitik at the University of 
Berlin. Between 1935 and 1939, he was also head of the 
Reichsarbeitsgemeinschaft fur Raumforschung and he became an 
SS OberfliHfer in 1942. In 1956, he was again an ordinary
professor, this time at Hannover's Technischen Hochschule. 
When volume 2 of Braune Universitat was published, Meyer was 
on the Hochschule faculty for Gartenbau und Landskultur.
^^Ibid. , 2:11-15. Fritz Baur ( D r J u r )  was born in 
Dilligen and was editor of the Kreis Tubingen (while still 
in his early twenties) in 1933. After an early association 
with the Reichssicherheitshauptamts of the Reichsfuhrer SS, 
Baur's academic and professional career moved quickly into 
other areas: he was an assistant at the University of
Tubingen in 1937, Landgerichtsrat at Heckingen in 1939, 
Assistant at the University o T T u b i n g e n  again in 1941, and 
extraordinary professor at the University of GieBen in 1942. 
In 1954, Baur was an ordinary professor at the University of 
Mainz, then transferred to the Law faculty of the University 
of Tubingen in 1956 only to arrive as Seminar Director in 
Law at the Eberhard-Karls-Universitat in Tubingen when Die 
Braune Universitat reached publication.
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not as a political banishment. Concerning Seeliger's docu­
mentation, Buchner pronounced it "streng korrelcte” (very cor 
rect). Baur, on the other hand, offered the following:
I will not try to talk my way out of this, 
that it makes a difference if one lives in a 
state where freedom is guaranteed or in a sys­
tem which as of February 28, 1933 suspended 
all such guarantees. You already know that 
in a practical sense they wiped out all the 
rules.
What I will say is the following: In the 
years after 1933 things were said and written 
that shame one even today-- twenty or thirty 
years later--it seems unintelligible. I con­
clude, as frankly as I can, that I can not 
make excuses that I was too young...that 
idealism overcame us, or that we were afraid 
about earning a living or, on the other hand, 
that our generation was afflicted with a 
physical or psychological flaw that freed us 
from the pangs of conscience. The "flaw 
theory" is a point of view that can be elab­
orated on, but not defended.
Melodramatically, Dr. Baur demonstrates that excuses 
of idealism, cowardice or naivete are inadequate to explain 
the Gleichschaltung even for the individual case. Even a 
combination of these forces and motivations within the 
crucible of Nazi Germany scarcely explains why a majority 
of German intellectuals either supported or passively ac­
cepted the political, professional and social conditions 
of the Nazizeit. What can be explained is the segmented 
and contradictory nature of the German intellectual's a d ­
justment to Nazism.
^^See Seeliger, Die Braune Universitat, 2:14-15.
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To neutralize public opposition, the Nazis had to iso­
late the individual. This had been accomplished for them 
partially (even before they became a movement) by the col­
lapse of 1918 and the Spartacist insurrection. An aliena­
tion born of political pessimism, economic dislocation and 
mob violence isolated a majority of Germans from each other. 
The German intellectual can be seen as a distinct example of 
the alienated German (depending on his connections with the 
Weimar government--an intellectual working for the civil 
service might not be as isolated as his jobless fellows), 
just as Germany can be seen as an alienated nation within 
Europe.
The degree of this alienation was an individual matter, 
but in the larger sense, the Nazis had to increase this 
atomization, no matter what its degree, to neutralize all 
opposition. Along this line, the Gestapo * s mission was to 
identify enemies of the state, but its real achievement was 
to break up any German groups outside Nazi party organiza­
tions. Certainly, fear of punishment by the Gestapo had a 
greater effect than actual persecution in keeping most Ger­
mans atomized in the political sense.
There was an intellectual isolation that accompanied 
the compartmentalization of German life into Nazi organiza­
tional units. It is significant that when intellectuals 
lacked the courage to resist Nazism by forming their own
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groups, loneliness and the need for an identity sometimes
pushed them into the branches of the Nazi party, and hence
13into the arms of the Nazis.
The irony of the Nazi state was that it was best served 
by intellectuals who probably, under other circumstances, 
would have remained apolitical. If the cult of personality 
surrounding Hitler and (to a much lesser degree) Goring, 
Goebbels, Himmler and Hess was at all warranted, it was b e ­
cause these men had so isolated the individual German as to 
seem as elephants before an ant--an ant that could expect 
little support from any of the millions of his fellows if 
he chose to confront these elephants.
But the cult of personality was a sham. It was a con­
struction of the Propaganda Ministry and it was successful 
principally through the film medium. Superb filming and 
skillful editing made Triumph of the Will (Riefenstahl,
1938) a propaganda masterpiece. It created the illusion 
that all Germany was spiritually dedicated to National S o ­
cialism and Adolf Hitler. This was a fabrication. While 
the atomication of the German people was remedied apparently
13Author's note: I am not suggesting that resistance 
movement of many kinds did not exist in Nazi Germany, nor 
for that matter, that only a few Germans were dissatisfied 
or secretly hostile to National Socialism in any of its 
forms. I believe, however, that most Germans as individuals 
accepted Nazism as a legitimate political order, or a gov­
erning power that they could do little to change--because 
they mistook a lack of massive opposition as evidence of 
massive approval.
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by National Socialism, this appearance belied the feelings 
of the majority of Germans when articulated upon self-refleetion 
The German intellectual's adjustment to Nazism was contradic­
tory and made more complex by self-delusion, corruption of 
principle, inexperience or simple naivete. Similarly, the 
motivations that would lead two academicians to write, let 
us suppose, two nearly identical propaganda pieces for the 
Dozentenbund (Assistants Union) might be altogether different. 
Further, there was no guarantee that either author would ex­
press sincere feelings, especially when their statements were 
wrapped up in party cliches.
This lack of sincerity is evident in one of Rolf Seeliger's 
challenge replies. Seeliger quoted Dr. Andreas Predohl^^ from 
his article "GroBraum, Autarkic und Weltwirtschaft'* (Room, 
Autarky and World Economy) in Das Neue Europa (1941):
The victory of German arms has brought 
up the question o f a European economy. In 
the last few years the National Socialist 
economy has transformed itself so that it 
can now unite economically with other con­
tinental European lands to run such an 
economy.
Andreas Predohl (Prof. Dr. Pol. S c . ; Dr. jur. h.c.) 
was born in Hamburg in 1893. A Dozent at the University of 
Kiel in 1924, he became an ordentlicher Professor in 1930 
at the Handelshochschule in Koenigsberg.
^^See Seeliger, Die Braune Universitat. 5:64. Accord­
ing to Seeliger, Dr. Predohl wa^ the chairman of the research 
committee of the Gesellschaft fur Euronaische Wirtschaftspla- 
nung und GroBenraumwirtschaft e.V. (Berlin) with which SS 
Brigadeführer Werner Best, State Secretary Roland Freisler
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While this statement is an unremarkable example of Geopolit­
ical thought, Seeliger puts Dr. Predohl on the defensive by 
quoting him thusly. In addition, Seeliger mentioned some 
unflattering connections between the doctor and the SS and 
Predohl felt compelled to answer that he was faced with a 
dilemma: He did not want to appear to be a Nazi to his col­
leagues overseas, yet in Germany, he did not want to appear 
disloyal to the Nazi regime. He simply made the best of a 
bad situation.
It appears that, in at least one case, an academician 
was compelled to write and say things in the Nazizeit that 
he did not mean wholeheartedly. In another case, this con­
flict of loyalties took on a deeper significance than mere
17appearance. Dr. Gerhard Fricke emphasized in his reply to 
Seeliger in Die Braune Universitat that there was a real con­
flict for him in trying to maintain his cultural and educa-
(Reich Ministry of Justice and State^^Secretary Leopold Gut- 
terer (Reich Ministry for Volksaufklarung and Propaganda) 
were connected and^^over which NS-Staatsrechtler Carl Schmitt 
and SS Standartenfuhrer Reinhard Hbhn shared control.
^^Ibid., 5:69.
^^Ibid., 3:48. Gerhard Fricke (Dr. Theol.; Dr. Phil.) 
was born in Waschke/Posen in 1901. At the University of 
Gottingen, he was an assistant in 1931. An extraordinary 
professor at the University of Berlin in 1934, he became 
an ordinary professor first at Kiel and then at Strassburg 
in 1941. At the time of publication of Die Braune Univer- 
sitUt he was an ordinary professor in German literary his­
tory at the University of Cologne.
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tional convictions in the face of a collective mass movement 
before which scientific and pedagogical traditions "evapo­
rated.
This conflict of principle and politics was by no means 
limited to Fricke, but was shared by hundreds of German in­
tellectuals who also made adjustments. Three such men were 
Gottfried Benn, Otto Hahn, and Martin Heidegger. In each 
case, the personality in question made his own choice without 
coercion. Each had favorable alternatives close at hand.
Gottfried Benn was born in 1886 in an old country village 
outside Berlin. His father's ancestors had taken their name 
from the Wends, who had inhabited that area of Prussia since 
the tenth century. Benn's mother was French-Swiss, but this 
hardly seemed an important distinction in a pre-Nazi Germany. 
Benn's childhood was spent in the company of the sons of local
nobility, growing up as he put it, "in the heartland of Prus- 
2 0sianism." Later, he went to the Academy for Military- 
Medical Instruction, by his own choice, to become an army 
surgeon. There was a military commitment to fulfill after
^^Ibid., 3:48.
See Gottfried Benn, Primal Vision (Norfolk, Conn.: 
New Direction Books, 1962), p. ix. In his introduction to 
this work, E. B. Ashton noted that Benn was once denounced 
as a Jew, after the Nazi takeover, but his family records 
were so complete and detailed that his adversary relented, 
fearing that his own background would be investigated and 
found wanting.
20Benn, Primal Vision, p. x.
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medical school, but in 1912 Benn was mustered out of the army 
due to a physical defect. In 1914, however, he reentered the 
army and served with German occupation forces in Belgium. He 
had been writing poems in his spare time, and now he began 
writing a play. Home Front, that dealt with the decay of 
reality.
Not until the 1920's after years of involvement with the 
German expressionist movement, did Benn become famous for his 
literary work. His style reflected pessimism and nihilism 
"read, admired, and promoted by a highbrow, humanistic minor­
ity of Germans while he [Benn] with the lowbrow majority, was
inching toward the primitives who were the sworn enemies of
21his audience." By the same token, Benn was often misunder­
stood. His lecture in 1931, The New Literary Season, showed 
another side of his philosophy. In this case, his defense of 
individual creativity, inspired by recent news of the commis­
sars' literary censorship program in Russia, showed his con­
cern for the survival of an independent point of view. But, 
in 1933, Gottfried Benn, like hundreds of other intellectuals, 
had to decide whether to accept the Nazis or go into the self- 
imposed exile of silence or emigration.
Benn never became a member of the Nazi party or claimed 
to be a member when the boast was fashionable. He decided.
^^Ibid., p. xiii.
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however, that he could not separate himself from his country 
or people. In a letter to a German friend in England, he 
revealed his reasons for staying in Germany:
So you sit at your beaches and call us to 
account for our cooperation in building a 
state whose faith is singular, whose serious­
ness is stirring, whose internal and external 
situation is so grave that it would take 
Iliads and Aeneids to tell its fate. Before 
all foreign countries you wish war, destruc­
tion, collapse, downfall to this state and 
its people. It is the nation whose language 
you speak, whose schools you attended, to 
whose cultivation of science and art you owe 
all your intellectual property, whose indus­
try printed your books, whose stages pre­
sented your plays, which gave you fame and 
reputation, by whose members you wished to 
read in the greatest possible number....
People means much ! My intellectual and 
economic existence, my language, my life, 
my human relations, the sum total of my 
brain--all this I owe to my people.... I 
close with something which you abroad, if 
you read this, will certainly want to know 
about : I am not in the Party, have no con­
tact with its leaders, and do not count on 
new friends. It is my fanatical purity which 
your letter honors me by mentioning, my purity 
of feeling and thought, that determines my 
attitude.22
Fanatical purity or no, Benn's appointment as head of 
the Poetry Section of the Prussian Academy of Arts was r e ­
scinded in 1936 after Nazi censors rediscovered some of the 
author's early work. Branded as defeatist literature, this 
early evidence of B e n n 's capacity forced his resignation.
Benn decided to return to the army, if it would have him, and
^^See Benn, Primal Vision, pp. 49-52.
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2 3his "army superiors stood by him."
It was in this last period of Germany's involvement with 
the Nazis that Benn's pessimism and caustic style reasserted 
themselves. After 1943, Benn, like many other Germans, rec­
ognized the beginning of the end. In 1944 in his "Novel of 
the Phenotype" Benn observed that while the phenotype of the 
seventeenth century celebrated "spiritualized ostentation" 
and that of the eighteenth century "secularized knowledge," 
"the phenotype of today integrates ambivalence, the fusion 
of every concept with its opposite.
In "Double Life" written in 1944-1945, Benn articulates 
not just his own disappointment, but Germany's total disil­
lusionment with a broken dream:
This plainly, was the government; and now 
we have the fifth war year, somber with defeats 
and miscalculations, evacuated continents, tor­
pedoed battleships, millions of dead, bombed- 
out giant cities, and still their leaders 
twaddle.... In looking at this w a r , and the 
peace that preceded it, one thing must not be 
ignored: the vast existential emptiness of 
today’s German man, stripped of whatever fills 
the inner space in other countries--decent 
national contents, public interest, criticism, 
social life, colonial impressions, genuine 
traditions. Here was nothing but a vacuum of 
historic twaddle, crushed education, bumptious 
political forgeries by the regime, and cheap 
sports.2 5
Otto Hahn, the famous radiochemist, also remained in
^^Ibid., p . xviii. 
^"^Ibid., p. 123. 
^^Ibid., pp. 138-140.
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Germany throughout the Nazi era, but his experience was more 
professional, and ]ess personal, than that of Benn. Hahn 
was a dedicated scientist and an exemplar of modern scien­
tific research. Yet, Otto Hahn was aware of the shortcomings 
of the Nazi administration, though he did little to curb its 
excesses outside his area of responsibility.
Hahn was born in Frankfurt am Main on March 8, 18 79 
and lived there until his entrance into Marburg University. 
After receiving his doctorate in chemistry, magna cum laude 
in 1901, he served a one year enlistment with his home regi­
ment. Returning to Marburg, Hahn became an assistant to 
a professor of organic chemistry. The turning point in Hahn's 
life came in 1904, when he went to London to do radium re­
search for Sir William Ramsay. In the process of routine 
experimentation in this new field, Hahn discovered a radio­
active element, radiothorium. Ramsay's excited praise con­
vinced Hahn to redirect his interests to the field of radio­
chemistry.
Returning to his homeland, Hahn met Lise Meitner at the 
University of Berlin in 1907. Their collaboration produced 
a number of discoveries over the next thirty years, leading 
to the award of the Nobel Prize in Chemistry for 1944. In­
terestingly, Hahn received news of this award while he was
^^See Willy Ley, Otto Hahn: A Scientific Biography (New 
York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1966), pp. 2-9.
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2 7in a British internment camp in Cambridge.
What had Hahn done to deserve internment? When he had
left Germany in February 1933, he had no "serious concern
for the future" and suspected that the Nazi victory would
2 8be short-lived. Hahn lectured at Cornell University in 
Ithaca, New York for most of the first five months of Hit­
ler's rule in Germany. Letters from Berlin about the Jewish 
purges gave Hahn his first serious doubts, and when Max 
Planck asked him to assume the directorship of the Haber 
Institute in Berlin, he did so only because Professor Haber 
(who had resigned in protest) wanted him to save the in­
stitute from dissolution. "As acting director, I tried to 
soften especially harsh orders from the people in power,"
remembered Hahn, "but of course I could not do anything about
29the general situation."
Within a few weeks, Hahn was sent back to his former
post at the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Chemistry, where he
30observed, with relief, that no change had been made. Here, 
he immersed himself in research until the Allies closed in 
on Berlin in April 1945. In 1946 Hahn was released by the 
British and he returned to Berlin to become the president of
^ Îbid.
^^Ibid., pp. 106-107. 
^^Ibid., p. 108. 
^®Ibid.
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31the Kaiser Wilhelm Society.
It became obvious at the time that a nation of Otto 
Hahns and Gottfried Benns could be shifted from position to 
position, fired, outraged and controlled with impunity by 
the Nazis. Hahn and Benn were giants in physics and poetry, 
yet they were no different, politically, than other Germans 
whose national loyalties were exploited by ruthless politi­
cal adventurers. Their civility, respect for authority and 
patience weighed favorably for the Nazis.
A paradox existed: A Germany ruled by the Nazis was,
at the same time, a homeland for scientists and poets. The 
"brown” university was both brown and a university. It is 
pure speculation to calculate how long such a situation could 
have continued, with the Nazis pressing for Gleichschaltung, 
and the academicians stoically holding on to their traditions. 
True, Nazis were becoming doctors of philosophy, political 
scientists, etc., on the slimmest of credentials. At the 
same time, Gottfried Benn was writing poetry and managing 
the Prussian Academy of Arts. Otto Hahn was demonstrating 
nuclear fission to the scientific world.
At the same time, the noted German philosopher, Martin 
Heidegger, denounced his mentor, Edmond Husserl. Perhaps 
Heidegger’s wholehearted support of National Socialism was 
more a philosophical exercise than a spectacle of a philos -
^^Ibid., p. 284.
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opher dragging his knowledge in the political mire. Never­
theless, Dagobert D. Runes maintained that Heidegger's b e ­
trayal was especially grievous:
I do not doubt that scientists and tech­
nicians, artisans and craftsmen, can be 
accomplished in their respective fields of 
endeavor and yet serve an evil master. But 
the philosopher is not a scientist, he is 
not a craftsman, he is not a technician, and 
his only contribution to the wide community 
is his love of wisdom--And if such has de­
serted him, he becomes another robot of the 
infernal crew of tyranny, and all his involved 
verbiage is just an evil breath in the windof time.
Born in Baden on September 26, 1889, Martin Heidegger 
studied philosophy at the University of Freiberg and received 
his doctorate in 1914. There followed several years of teach­
ing before he became a professor of philosophy at Marburg in 
1923. In 1928 he followed Edmond Husserl to become director 
of philosophy at the University of Freiberg.
In 1933 Martin Heidegger became rector of Freiberg and 
proclaimed his support of the Nazis in an address to the 
students of Heidelberg on July 1, 1933. It is interesting 
that Heidegger's determination to practice a phenomenologi­
cal philosophy-- that is, a determination on his part to dis­
regard conventions and traditions to "uncover the structure 
of human reality"--made him a willing victim of the pessi­
mistic and sensational purposes of National Socialism:
^^Martin Heidegger, German Existentialism (New York: 
Philosophical Library, Inc., 1965), p. 12.
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Hitherto the university has researched 
and taught in the same way for many decades.
Research was supposed to lead to teaching, 
and a comfortable compromise between the two 
was sought-..nobody ever worried about the 
state of the university as a community... 
teaching became goalless, and hid itself b e ­
hind a tangle of examination regulations.
Now there is a sharp battle to be fought 
in the spirit of National Socialism which 
must not stifle on account of humanistic,
Christian notions that hold us down by their 
imprecision. It is also not sufficient to 
pay lip service to the New Order...old hum­
drum habits will not be given a new drive 
by it. The only serious token of identifi­
cation with the New Order is the experience 
of need, the grappling with reality.33
Unfortunately, Heidegger, even as he warned against delusion, 
was misled by National Socialism’s quick, seemingly effort­
less successes in Poland, France and (initially) Russia.
In the heady atmosphere of victory, Heidegger felt he was 
reacting naturally to life on a phenomenological basis.
^^Ibid., p. 24.
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CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSION
In the last 450 years, war has become more mechanized, 
specialized and complicated than in the two thousand years 
preceding this era. The sophistication of weaponry today 
is so far removed from the weaponry of the First World War 
that one can group the latter with the Thirty Years* War 
and place the former in a distinct position of its own.
Even the Second World War, as a transition from the old to 
the new, equated mass with the conventional masses of men 
and non-nuclear firepower; mobility was measured in miles 
per hour and shock was measured in armor, cannon firepower 
and, again mass. Today on the strategic level, mobility is 
measured in thousands of miles per hour, firepower is m ea­
sured in megatons of TNT, and shock and mass are both incor­
porated in the same weapon: the thermonuclear bomb.
So overwhelming are the facts surrounding nuclear capa­
bilities of both the United States and the Soviet Union that 
the whole world has been changed politically and psychologi­
cally to a degree hitherto unknown. We live with the know­
ledge that nuclear war is unthinkable, but not unimaginable 
and certainly not impossible. This situation is predicated
88
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on two weapons developed and used in World War Two: The V-2
ballistic missile and the atomic bomb.
But what has this to do with the German intellectual’s 
adjustment to Nazism? First, the V-2 was the creation of 
German scientists co-opted and funded by the Nazis. Second, 
the atomic bomb was the goal of the Manhattan Project, a mas­
sive United States defense enterprise employing thousands of 
technicians, scientists and engineers. The Manhattan Project 
was prompted by a belief that Nazi Germany was working on an 
atomic bomb.  ̂ Together, they represented a fraction of the 
wartime technology that determined our present reality and 
continue to influence our future.
In a larger sense, compartmentalization is the real point 
of this chapter. It is an increasingly common requisite of 
modern technology and it must be regarded for its significance. 
Moreover, the amorality of compartmentalization as a "fact of 
life" in industrialized cultures must be emphasized.
There was a chord of resonance in the excitement that the 
German rocket scientists at Peenemunde felt for their work and 
the enthusiasm that American scientists at Los Alamos expressed 
at the prospects of the atom bomb. As Dieter Huzel said later
According to Stéphane Groueff, Manhattan Project (Bos­
ton: Little, Brown § Company, 1967), p. 24, Dr. Leo Szilard, 
a Hungarian emigre and physicist, convinced Albert Einstein 
to sign a group letter from concerned physicists to F.D.R. 
in which the president was warned that, in all probability, 
the Germans had begun work on an atomic bomb.
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of the attitude held by his colleagues:
Looking back,,from now, 1962, I realize 
that the Peenemunde engineer * s view of the 
V-2 was little different from the Convair 
engineer’s view of the Atlas, or the Doug­
las engineer's view of the Thor t o d a y .2
There is no suggestion of self-righteousness or hatred 
for the enemy in Huzel’s words. Rather, the common ground 
for the German engineer and the American physicist was the 
beautiful intricacy of their work. The application of their 
skills to war came as only an afterthought. The overwhelm­
ing impression one gets is that naivete, disinterest and 
narrow professionalism unite to make the intellectual see 
his work in virtum, without the least concern for what im­
pact the end product will have on society. There is a dread­
ful irony in Wehrner von Braun's case: At the end of the war, 
von Braun and most of his staff sought out the Americans and 
offered them their services. The United States, in turn, 
offered these rocket specialists a smooth passage to America, 
and von Braun later became an American citizen. The man who
^See Dieter K. Huzel, Peenemunde To Canaveral (Englewood 
Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1962), p. 194,
•ZSee von Braun and Frederick I. Ordway III, History of 
Rocketry and Space Travel (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 
1969), pp. 114-116. O n p a g e  104, Frederick Ordway III stated 
"...Even more important, however, was the know-how that was 
literally captured when the majority of German rocket scien­
tists and engineers surrendered to American soldiers in 1945. 
For the Germans were dominant in every field of missiles and 
rockets during World War II. In a very real sense, they 
created modern military rocket technology. Virtually all 
postwar missile developments were based, in varying degrees, 
on what went on in Germany."
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provided Hitler’s vengeance weapon also helped build the 
Minuteman and Titan missile systems and helped send Americans 
to the moon- Just where were/are von Braun’s allegiances?
Such a question misses the point. Von Braun's political 
allegiance is of secondary importance both to himself and to 
the people with whom he has dealt all of his life. The e m ­
phasis has been on his ability to produce successful results 
in rocketry, and these successes have provided the major 
source of satisfaction in his life. Von Braun did not work 
for Hitler, nor did he work for the Americans. Von Braun 
worked for the advancement of rocketry. The relatively 
little damage done by the V-2 assuages his conscience, if 
any rationalization is needed at all.^
Today, we Americans are ready to blot out several hun­
dred millions of the enemy, if that enemy launches a nuclear 
attack on us. The arrangement is reciprocal; an attack by us 
would prompt massive retaliation from the Soviet Union. This 
is the principle of nuclear deterrence, which keeps both super­
powers from doing the unthinkable. The weapon systems are so 
vast in destructive power and so numerous and myriad in deploy­
ment and type tïiat neither side presently has any hope of vic­
tory in a nuclear war. Will this situation continue forever?
^Fifteen hundred V-2's landed in England causing 2,500 
deaths and what is termed "heavy" damage. (Ibid., p. 108.) 
However, at the same time, Allied bomber groups had destroyed 
Hamburg and Dresden completely during the w a r , with roughly 
150,000 deaths among the inhabitants of these cities.
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That is unlikely. The history of warfare is a history 
of obsolescence; a defense has been found for every weapon 
heretofore, even the psychological defense of nuclear deter­
rence. Weapons of a revolutionary type that will make the 
submarine fleet, the missile squadron and the bomber wing 
obsolete are not improbable. In the rit-to-distant future, 
such weapons seem likely.
What may not change is the intellectual community’s 
willingness to build such weapons. The German intellec­
tual’s adjustment to Nazism is an object lesson in amoral 
participation. Disregarding the morality of Nazi Germany 
in the last war, one still finds that the intellectual 
community in Germany accepted the Nazis and actively sup­
ported them in many instances. At the same time, the intel­
lectual community in America supported the United States 
government in its search for the atomic bomb. Some of the 
American intellectuals, like Robert Oppenheimer, had second 
thoughts about the bomb, but only after the fact. With all 
the naivete of debutantes, the intellectuals handed the 
United States military a weapon one thousand times more power 
ful than any conventional bomb of comparable weight (the H- 
bomb is roughly one million times more powerful) and recoiled 
with girlish astonishment when the nuclear warriors demanded 
hundreds more.
If there is a bridge over the gap between the German
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intellectual and his Western counterpart, it is this: the
intellectual in the purest sense, isolates himself from other 
segments of society and consequently confuses social and ethi­
cal ignorance for innocence. The intellectual community of 
any nation should have some responsibility for that nation's 
direction politically and ethically, but this is not the case. 
Whenever intellectuals have sought political power in America 
(with some outstanding exceptions, like Thomas Jefferson), 
they have been looked on with suspicion, amusement or ridi­
cule. The "egghead" prejudice of the 1950’s comes to mind.
The caricature of the wizened old scientist puttering 
about his test tubes, or the hoary scholar blowing dust from 
his tomes is still one of America's favorite jokes. The in­
creasing complexity of scholarship continues to isolate the 
intellectual from the rest of society to a large degree.
Added to this isolation is the atomization of society as a 
whole. Workers, soldiers, diplomats, politicians, business­
men, etc., become more and more symbols of their work and 
less and less men with a common bond of ethics or morality. 
Perhaps the only great attraction of totalitarianism is that 
it functions compartmentally (just as we function in the West) 
but it goes to great lengths to try to unify its people under 
an "ism." This attempt, like the Nazi experiment, may be a 
well-oiled fabrication. It is quite possible that the Soviet 
Union as a technological state, suffers the same atomization
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of its peoples that we do--perhaps they experience this p r o b ­
lem to an even greater degree. A statistical analysis of 
atomization is impossible, but social isolation is pronounced 
in the industrialized states, and it is tangible if not sta­
tistically measurable.
The German intellectual was but an isolated entity in a 
segmented society. As a member of the "masses,*’ he could not 
be expected to unite with his fellows to provide an ethical 
or moral barricade against National Socialism. The Nazis 
knew this, and dealt with the German intellectual piecemeal. 
They extracted his knowledge, exploited his talents, and used 
his discoveries and inventions. In return, they gave his life 
direction, anointed him with praise, and gave him a new sense 
of identity. Traditional morality had no part in this p r o ­
cess. The Nazis operated under their own rules, without re­
gard to preconceived notions of universal humanity or prin­
cipled restraint, and the German intellectual operated not 
by morality, but by expediency.
The German intellectual became an increasingly indis­
pensable member of German society during the Hitler era. In 
a technological age, this was true for any modern nation and 
any national group of intellectuals. While there were always 
exceptions to the rule the majority of the German intelligent­
sia were not emigres, concentration camp inmates, or under­
ground resistance fighters. Fully 80 percent of all university
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educated Germans gave valuable service to the Reich in peace 
and war. Many did so freely; others had to be drafted and 
offered various degrees of resistance.
A naive observer would assume that Nazism drew its 
major strength from the handful of fanatics who composed its 
top leadership. This attitude is especially characteristic 
of the observer who is ready to denounce German war crimes, 
but not the German people. Simplified reasoning might lead 
one to conclude that since any crimes against humanity com­
mitted by an authoritarian state require orders from instruct­
ing officials, clearly-defined war criminals can be found 
among the political hierarchy. The Nuremberg Tribunal worked 
on this principle, because it was believed to be sound.
But National Socialism required more than leadership in 
order to build its strength in Germany and reach out for half 
the world. It needed the tacit approval of all but a small 
minority of the German people. In order to genuinely succeed 
Nazism had to insure its support or at least a lack of opposi­
tion from all walks of life and every social station. Only 
the Jews could be excluded for obvious reasons.
As a technological state on the road to war, Germany d e ­
pended on the loyalty and creativity of its intelligentsia to 
sustain itself. More than manpower, the Wehrmacht depended . 
on advanced weapons of war and was strengthened by continual 
improvement of these weapons. Germany's engineers, mathema­
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ticians, scientists and doctors -- in short, Germany's academic 
community and professional intelligentsia--provided the left 
side of the equation for victory. Their research findings 
made Germany’s war technology possible.
This thesis was written to illustrate the German intel­
lectual's reaction to Nazism, the conditions dictating his 
willingness to conform, and some suggestion of his involve­
ment in so-called war crimes. His class background, economic 
status, and professional attitude in no way precluded active 
cooperation with the Nazi government. The myth that educated 
intelligence implies heightened morality, likewise, was proven 
false in the German intellectual’s case.
The German intelligentsia’s conformity under the authori­
tarian system points to a universal law of human nature. The 
human animal generally seeks the course of least resistance. 
Only the unusual person struggles when he does not have to 
struggle. National Socialism worked on the authoritarian 
principle and applied the tactic of two courses: one re­
quired acceptance, or at least no resistance to the dictates 
of the Nazi party; the other, more difficult psychologically 
and physically, meant recognized opposition, leading to e x ­
pulsion, imprisonment or death. With such alternatives, most 
Germans either chose to support Nazism or refused to resist 
it. It was a Machiavellian exercise. The German intellec­
tual's adjustment to Hitler was only one example of its suc­
cess .
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But, how effective was the Gleichschaltuiig in strength­
ening the Nazis' state machinery? That is, with the intel­
lectuals under control, to what extent were the Nazis* aims 
carried out? In many cases, intellectuals in the SS complied 
with directives to the letter, but one would be naive to a s ­
sume that in all areas of state bureaucracy (even within the 
SS) that every instruction was followed exactly, or passed 
down the chain-of-command exactly as stated.
An additional purpose of this thesis was to give some 
consideration to individual impressions of the Gleichschaltung, 
to discuss some authoritative views on the German adjustment 
to Nazism, and allow the author to suggest a theory: Political
amorality among intellectuals is possibly a function of social 
and professional compartmentalization in modern technocracies. 
If expediency was the rule among German intellectuals between 
1933 and 1945, I suspect this fact of life has changed very 
little in the last thirty years. Nor, is this condition 
limited to Germany. A system of ethics is very often the 
first casualty of expediency. If all ethics are negotiable, 
then atrocities may result. Other industrialized nations of 
the West suffer the atomization of sophisticated technology 
and have professional intellectuals just as narrow-minded 
and self-interested as any found in Germany. Hopefully, the 
present generation is more aware of the dangers of expediency 
than the G e m a n  intellectual of 1933 may have noted, but ig­
nored. If not, the future may be fatal to us all.
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